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Selected Compendium of Student Research

Volume IV

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SELECTED COMPENDIUM OF STUDENT RESEARCH

VOLUME IV

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE

ACADEMIC YEAR 1991-1992

Prepared by the

School of Intelligence Studies
Defense Intelligence College

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Defense Intelligence College
Washington, DC 20340-5485

Selected Compendium of Student Research: Volume IV

Background: The Defense Intelligence College

The Defense Intelligence College (DIC) is chartered by US Department of Defense directive and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) memorandum to provide educational and training programs to prepare military and civilian intelligence personnel for positions in the national and international security structure and to assist in their career development.

Since 1980, when Congress authorized DIC to confer the Degree of Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI), more than 700 MSSI degrees have been awarded. The College's MSSI degree is the only advanced degree in strategic intelligence granted in the United States.

In order to complete the MSSI program, students are required to satisfactorily complete either a Master's thesis or two research papers in conjunction with special research seminars offered by the College. The papers thus produced represent a potentially important contribution to the literature on strategic intelligence. They embody an impressive array of subjects indicative of the far-reaching nature of intelligence analysis.

The Compendium

The fourth volume of the Student Compendium includes selected unclassified student papers and theses completed during the 1991-1992 academic year. Each paper is listed alphabetically by author, including the name of the approving faculty member, date of completion, title of paper, and abstract.

The views contained in the papers included in this Compendium are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policy, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Intelligence College, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

To Request Papers

Papers listed in this publication can be requested in writing to the Academic Research Center, Defense Intelligence College, DIA/DEE-4, Washington, DC 20340-5485 (ATTN: COMP4). DIC is required to obtain, for each paper, permission for release from the Office of Security, Defense Intelligence Agency.

Anthony, David L. (Swenson)

AUG 1992

In Defense of Japan

Japan, in response to US force reductions in the Pacific, will assume a larger role in the management of regional defense. Despite the end of the Cold War, issues including a regional arms race, the stand-off in Korea, tenuous relations with China, and the territorial dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands necessitate a viable and credible regional Japanese defense capability. The Japanese government can manage the legal, political, and domestic constraints on its defense establishment in favor of Japan's evolving defense needs. The build-up of the Self-Defense Forces in the 1980s and the emerging overseas role of the SDF serve as precedents to foster a larger Japanese military/security role.

More military proficiency will not necessarily cause Japan to become a military threat to the United States. The SDF's influence will be confined to its present boundaries, because Japan currently lacks and does not plan to acquire the strategic offensive weapons to project power beyond its 1000 nm perimeter. Further, domestic political and social factors and Japan's Asian neighbors will constrain the potential for military expansion beyond a regional defense role. Accordingly, it will be necessary for Japan to continue to base its defense policy on alliance with the US for any expanded Japanese military role to be acceptable to the rest of Asia. As such, a stronger Japanese military ally will be conducive to American security in the region as US forces are reduced.

Armstrong, Reginald A.T. (Pieragostini)

AUG 1992

The Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Program: Implications for Proliferation

It is in the interest of the United States to stem nuclear proliferation. The *National Security Strategy of the United States*, in describing the fundamental security interests of the country, states that no arms control objective is "more urgent than stopping the global proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as the missiles to deliver them."

Nuclear proliferation threatens US national security interests both at home and abroad. A nuclear-armed Iran, for example, could imperil US interests in the Persian Gulf, or perhaps influence a terrorist group to float a nuclear weapon up the Potomac River. States with leaders like Saddam Husein will be infinitely more dangerous if they possess nuclear weapons. We cannot afford to assume they will display the restraint that has typified the nuclear weapons states since the close of World War II.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of nuclear facilities have continued since the end of Operation DESERT STORM, revealing an Iraqi nuclear weapons program comprehensive in scope, extensive in resources, and dangerously close to fruition. At the beginning of the Gulf War, Iraq was 12 to 18 months away from completing a crude nuclear device, and only two to three years from developing a deliverable nuclear arsenal. This is in alarming contrast to estimates before the war which assessed, as late as August 1990, Iraq as five to ten years away from having the bomb.

This study focuses on the reasons behind the success of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, assessing the Iraqi program in detail, including factors which allowed development to go undetected. By analyzing the program and evaluating development, this thesis identifies the key reasons for such surprisingly secret progress. Implications of this case for the future are discussed, and several policies are recommended in order to deal with future proliferation.

Drug Trafficking and the Southwest Border: Four Steps to Improve Drug Interdiction

In the late 1980s, narcotics abuse became the main threat to US National Security. The evolution of US counternarcotics policies and programs has taken a dramatic turn in the past decade, and success in south Florida and the Caribbean has caused drug trafficking organizations to use the US-Mexican border as an entry point for drugs.

US-Mexican drug interdiction and eradication programs along the Southwest border have produced an increase in the amount of illicit drugs seized and destroyed. However, the porous 2000 mile border remains the main entry point for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Two key components of the interdiction and eradication campaigns are US-Mexican relations and information sharing between US Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (US DLEAs) and the Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR). While the "drug war" has not been won, there have been some gains in bilateral counternarcotics issues between the US and Mexico.

This paper covers the drugs of abuse, US and Mexican counternarcotics organizations, land and air interdiction programs, and DoD intelligence support in the "drug war" along the Southwest border. Steps to improve the Southwest border drug trafficking problem are discussed.

Operation TORCH: An Intelligence Success Story

Allied efforts to successfully defeat the German Army in French North Africa in World War II incorporated research and development, operations, and intelligence techniques. Combined Chiefs of Staff (CoS) use of ULTRA intelligence throughout the planning and execution of Operation TORCH was a key factor in the success of TF 34. ULTRA intelligence enabled the Allies to reroute their Atlantic troop convoys away from the German U-boat threat.

Operation TORCH was not a simple intelligence task; it was extremely intensive, with numerous deception plans interwoven throughout the planning and execution stages. TORCH introduced the concept of combined Allied operations for an invasion of North Africa. Despite numerous disputes, the Allies were able to move two convoys, one from England (1500 miles) and one from the United States (4000 miles) through the Atlantic and Mediterranean without detection by U-boats. This paper details the events which led to Operation TORCH by examining the emergence of the threat, Allied efforts to successfully plan and defeat the threat, the role of ULTRA intelligence throughout this process, and the success of TF 34. The paper concludes with the valuable lessons derived from this experience which are relevant to the US Intelligence Community today.

Secrecy in America: Oversight in the Intelligence Community

Over the past 20 years, the Intelligence Community has been involved in a number of developments which have changed the conduct of intelligence operations. No development, however, whether related to technology or methodology, has been more important than that of Congressional oversight and concern over the role of covert activity in a democratic society.

Seymour Hersch's "Family Jewels," which outlined activities of the CIA, and later revelations of Iran-Contra have led Congressional leaders to develop mechanisms to monitor intelligence operations. Reforms have included the development of permanent select committees in both the House and Senate in addition to several Executive Orders addressing the conduct of intelligence operations. Inherent in the aforementioned changes has been the debate over how to develop proper methodology to conduct oversight. Problems have ranged from unauthorized disclosure of classified information to infringement upon the President's constitutional powers to conduct foreign policy.

In addition to questions of methodology, there has been a heated debate concerning the Intelligence Community's need for secrecy and American democratic values. The public view of elected officials has changed drastically in the

past 20 years; a blind faith no longer exists in our representatives in Washington. Questions have surfaced regarding not only the legality but the morality of covert activity. The question policymakers face is how to satisfy the public's need for information and provide adequate oversight of intelligence operations without jeopardizing US national security.

Ashley, Robert P., Jr. (Page)

DEC 1991

Targeting the Cartel's Financial Operations Could Mean Hard Times for the Andes

For over two decades, the US Government has attempted to counter the flow of narcotics. After nearly a decade of political rhetoric, the drug problem in America continues to grow. Today, narcotics trafficking is undermining the economy and threatening social stability by spreading violence, crime, and corruption. While the Federal Government continues to pursue a four-pronged strategy of interdiction, crop substitution, law enforcement, and eradication, Washington is recognizing that a change must be made in how cartel operations are targeted. Recently, the Bush Administration introduced a new strategy which focuses on "high-value targets." Once such high-value target gaining more attention as a potential Achilles' heel of the drug industry is money laundering. Over the past two years, anti-narcotics strategists have gradually increased the emphasis on money laundering in the war on drugs. Amid the financial sleight-of-hand and cartel maneuvering to avoid detection, the government is getting tougher on both banking institutions and traffickers.

What, however, does a successful US drug strategy mean to the people of the Andes? A number of issues must be discussed when considering the impact of the cocaine industry on the Andean nations. While cocaine has provided employment opportunities and ready access to much-needed cash, new expectations and aspirations, degraded accepted social values, and weaker industrial development are all products of the cocaine economy.

The war on drugs is a war of economics. If US strategy is to be successful, it can no longer attack the counternarcotics problem as strictly a matter of law enforcement. The cocaine industry was born in the economic disparity of the producing nations, and there it must be combatted.

Ballard, Christopher S. (Morris)

JUL 1991

The ALSOS Mission, 1943-1945: A Case Study of Scientific Human Intelligence Operations in World War II

The ALSOS Mission was a scientific human intelligence (HUMINT) operation created by the War Department in 1943 at the request of General Leslie R. Groves, commander of the Manhattan Project, to uncover conclusive evidence on the state of Nazi German research and development of atomic weapons. Made up of civilian scientists and military intelligence personnel, ALSOS followed advancing Allied forces in Europe, confiscating enemy research facilities, experiments, and documents and interrogating German scientists in order to develop an accurate picture of Nazi nuclear capabilities.

By November 1944, ALSOS had gathered what it believed to be irrefutable evidence that the Germans were not capable of producing nuclear weapons, contrary to early suspicions and assumptions, nor were they likely to have such weapons before the end of the war. This intelligence enabled Allied military leaders to aggressively execute the final stages of the war plan without fear or threat of German nuclear "super weapons." By April 1945, ALSOS ended the struggling German atomic weapons program by interning ten of its most important physicists and dismantling its remaining experiments in Germany.

This case study traces the evolution of the ALSOS Mission from 1943 to 1945, highlighting the factors which led to its unique intelligence success. While the good working climate among the American scientific and military communities and the consolidated all-source atomic intelligence effort within the Manhattan Project were important factors, the special character of ALSOS as both a scientific and military human intelligence operation was the key to its success. On-the-spot scientific expertise coupled with high-level military authority and administrative support enabled ALSOS to move quickly and freely behind the Allied advance, collecting hard physical evidence which other methods and agencies could not provide.

The Role of the National Islamic Front in the Sudanese Civil War

The National Islamic Front (NIF) has played a large role in Sudan's civil war. This paper focuses on NIF's control of the Sudanese government and military. NIF policies are resulting in a crippled economy, a starving population, and military purges of thousands of officers and tens of thousands of NCOs and soldiers. NIF's continued liquidation of military opposition, failure to follow proven principles of war, and continued use of inappropriate tactics have caused the deterioration of the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF) combat effectiveness.

A basic sketch of Sudan's ethnic, cultural, and geographic diversity, combined with a description of the 36 year North-South conflict and separation explain the current political situation. This analysis looks at historical causes for Sudan's split as well as how NIF has continued maintaining the split through oppression and human rights abuses. SPAF combat operations from before the June 1989 coup through the current government's 1992 "Final Offensive" operation are examined in order to better understand NIF's control of the civil war.

NIF's desire to expand Islamic awakening into other African countries is discussed. By failing to defeat the South militarily, however, NIF's ability to encourage the spread of Islamic awakening throughout Sudan and into other countries has been constrained. Since the Sudanese Islamic Revolution has experienced difficulty establishing legitimacy in its own country, it is less able to serve as a model and actively assist beginning movements.

Three possible future courses of action are examined. First, a military coup succeeds in ousting NIF and ends the civil war. Second, the opposing sides refuse to make concessions, and the civil war continues indefinitely. Third, and most probably, after some continued fighting, North and South gradually cease combat operations, increase negotiations, and reach a tentative agreement which eventually leads to peaceful coexistence.

Brunn, Charles C. (Swenson)

SEP 1992

Central Asian Uncertainties: Domestic and Foreign Influences on New States

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Central Asia has received unprecedented international attention. For the first time in the modern era, indigenous Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Azeri political leaders are drafting national charters for post-Soviet social, political, and economic development. Despite gaining international recognition as sovereign nations, the six states are economic basketcases, and the region is a socio-political tinderbox. A successful transition to a workable market economy under legitimate governing authorities must be achieved soon. Growing social discontent has already erupted into ethnic and sectarian violence. Will secular democratic governments emerge, or will continued strife spawn religious extremism or prompt a return to outright authoritarianism?

This paper examines the hypothesis that the newly independent Central Asian states will develop secular, quasi-democratic governments. Several key domestic and foreign determinants will explore whether a secular or Islamic-based political system will exist in each of the six nations considered. At home, Islam, ethnic relations, economy, and legitimacy and liberalization of existing regimes will provide concurrent and sometimes contradictory socio-political forces. At the same time, regional powers are competing for security, economic, and cultural influence in the region.

Today, Central Asians are reacting to these domestic and foreign influences. Some Central Asian states are more likely than others to remain secular. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have initiated political and economic reforms while maintaining ethnic tranquility. Tajikistan, however, may very well form an Islamic-based government following civil war. The nature of future socio-political order in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan is less certain due to unsettled international and domestic situations.

The world community is anxious about the region's future socio-political preferences, and with good reason, with the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism, sale of advanced weapons, and transfer of dangerous technology. The future orientation of these states, with a combined population of over 60 million and a substantial conventional military capability, will determine the geopolitical stability of the Middle East and greater Asia for the foreseeable future.

Geopolitical Considerations for the Future of Russian-Ukrainian Relations

Most studies on Russian-Ukrainian relations focus on the relative military strength of each republic as the main factor in determining whether tensions between the two will escalate into armed conflict. However, they fail to examine the underlying geopolitical considerations which may affect the utilization of their military forces. By looking at population characteristics, economics, and current military capabilities of the two countries, a more comprehensive examination of the future relationship between Russia and Ukraine can be conducted.

Although Russia has greater natural resources (area, raw materials, population) available, ethnic and ideological conflicts within the Russian republic will weaken its ability to impose its will on other CIS republics. In addition, extensive economic interdependencies between Ukraine and Russia make them dependent on one another for survival. These factors make it likely that Moscow and Kiev will take actions to avoid the possibility of the conflict worsening to the point of severed relations or armed conflict. However, their differences will continue to be heard in the media as political leaders use rhetoric to seek support for their domestic and foreign policies.

Campbell-Currie, Dawn M. (Gordon)

JUL 1992

Intelligence and Disarmament: Germany 1918-1939

Germany's evasion of the Treaty of Versailles was the result of its leaders' efforts to rebuild a strong and united Germany in the wake of World War I. These efforts were made possible, in part, by political realities and shortcomings in Allied intelligence capabilities. Insights into Germany's successful rearmament can be gained from an examination of intelligence's role during four distinct periods: (1) 1918 to early 1920, monitoring German disarmament; (2) 1920-1926, monitoring German compliance with the ability to conduct on-site inspections; (3) 1927-1935, monitoring German compliance but no longer conducting on-site inspections; and (4) 1935-1939, changing the mission to strategic warning after Hitler abrogated the Treaty of Versailles.

Limited collection capabilities and an emphasis on quantifiable intelligence contributed to the Allied failure to uncover motivations and non-military actions taken to circumvent the Treaty of Versailles. In addition, intelligence professionals had limited influence on policymakers who failed to see that the long term implications of not addressing minor violations would result in continued German circumvention of the Treaty.

The success of the Treaty of Versailles depended upon Allied willingness to address violations when intelligence uncovered them; however, it became apparent that none of the Allies were willing to do so.

Carney, Donald J. (Blake)

AUG 1991

Executive-Legislative Relations in the Creation of the National Drug Intelligence Center

During the late 1980s, the attention of both the executive and legislative branches increasingly focused on the US drug problem. Congressional hearings and investigations and research by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) indicated that federal government drug intelligence, while strong and well financed in the tactical and operational fields, lacked broad-brush, sophisticated, policy-oriented intelligence. In addition, law enforcement intelligence lacked some of the tools, such as automated data processing, centralized collection, and tasking and information sharing, crucial to better understanding of the problem. Strategic drug intelligence occupied the unfavorable position of being on the periphery of two communities, law enforcement and intelligence, with no plan for substantive change.

Acting on its congressional mandate, ONDCP developed a plan for a new organization to fill the strategic drug intelligence center (NDIC). The NDIC proposal, however, took on life of its own during congressional proceedings. The Senate Appropriations Committee rejected NDIC as duplicative and unwarranted, forbidding Department of Justice participation in the center. The House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee adopted NDIC, placing it under the

authority of the Secretary of Defense and in the district of the subcommittee chairman. Congressional involvement in the process substantially affected NDIC's ability to carry out or even define its mission.

This paper discusses NDIC's complex and frustrating path, including the development of new agendas for the drug war, funding, and congressional restrictions. Coping with congressional rules, pitfalls of greater intelligence efforts in the drug war, and means to increase NDIC's chance of success and better its fortunes on Capitol Hill are also examined.

Carrick, Charles L. (Morris)

AUG 1992

Intelligence and the Failure of Operation SHINGLE

By late 1943, the Allied offensive in Italy had bogged down south of Rome. Allied planners devised Operation SHINGLE, an amphibious landing at Anzio, to envelop the German flank, break open the campaign, and rapidly seize Rome. The operation, executed on 22 January 1944, was a prolonged and costly failure. The resulting four-month long stalemate was only relieved by a breakthrough on the main front in May 1944. This failure came despite detailed Allied knowledge of German capabilities and intentions. This paper clarifies the role played by Allied intelligence during Operation SHINGLE, assesses the responsibility of the Allied intelligence effort for the operation's lack of success, and illuminates the relationship of intelligence, operations, and logistics at Anzio.

To answer these questions, the quantity and quality of intelligence gathered by the Allies is assessed by examining a range of intelligence products issued during the operation. The extent intelligence was used as a basis for operational and logistical planning is analyzed through the evolution of the concept of operations in the context of available intelligence. Accounts by the operational commanders involved illuminate the practical effects of intelligence in the operation.

The Allied intelligence effort was very successful in providing detailed information on the location, disposition, and strength of every German unit capable of interfering with SHINGLE. Although intelligence underestimated the speed with which the enemy deployed against the beachhead, this flaw did not determine either the success or failure of the operation.

The fundamental failing of SHINGLE was that the planning process did not rigorously assess the amount of combat power and logistical support required for the mission in terms of the detailed information on enemy capabilities and intentions provided by Allied intelligence. As a result, the Allies mounted SHINGLE with inadequate resources, and in so doing, wasted an opportunity to shorten the Italian campaign considerably.

Carrick, Charles L. (Watson)

SEP 1992

Troublesome Portents: Media-Military Relations and the Gulf War

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, there has been an great deal of controversy over restrictions placed on the media. The media have sponsored numerous *fora*, and journalists have written a large number of books on the subject. The military, meanwhile, has remained relatively passive, avoiding open confrontation with the press and promising cooperation with media leaders to improve the quality of future war coverage. This situation is similar to, though more intense than, the post-Grenada and Panama state of media-military relations. This paper examines the nature of the media-military controversy that emerged during the Gulf War and assesses the prospects for any systematic improvements in relations between the military and the press in the future.

The evolution of the media-military relationship is traced from the Vietnam War to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Assumptions and myths which coat conventional perceptions of media-military relations are dispelled. A paradox exists that neither party to the debate wishes to acknowledge: there is a tradeoff between press freedom in a war theater and the effective use of war as a tool of national policy. The probable course of the continuing evolution of media-military relations is evaluated as is the effect this will have on the conduct of US foreign and security policy.

The media-military relationship is characterized by sharp differences of philosophy and professional self-interest. These differences suggest there is little hope for substantial improvement in the climate between the press and the Pentagon. Indeed, the antipathies now existing are likely to grow. In future wars, the public relations battle between the

media and the military will be decided on a war-by-war basis. A quick, cheap war will result in overwhelming public support for the military. Anything else will gradually reduce the national will to continue the conflict. The implications of this scenario for the conduct of US foreign policy are ominous.

Coder, Barbara J. (Swenson)

SEP 1992

Czechoslovakia and Hungary: Prospective "Hinges" to an East European Gateway?

The collapse of Soviet communism and the end of the Cold War have dramatically changed the world's geopolitics. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the rapidly changing international landscape has triggered speculation about Eastern Europe's present and future roles in the worldwide geopolitical system. This thesis examines an important aspect of the idea that Eastern Europe will emerge as a "Gateway region," linking two major parts of the world's geopolitical system.

A premise of the Gateway region concept is that key states or "hinges" take the lead as economic and social mediators in opening the region. Characteristics of a prospective hinge state include an entrepreneurial tradition, skilled work force, developed distribution and transportation infrastructure, developed economy, limited natural resources, compact size and shape, and small population. The existence of at least one hinge state is essential to creating a favorable investment climate that could lift Eastern Europe from an economic backwater to a Gateway region status.

When examining Eastern Europe today, economists and foreign investors generally agree that the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary appear best placed geographically and economically to succeed. As two of the region's most enterprising countries, they show promise of leading the way in Eastern Europe and becoming the model for their neighbors. Given their proximity to both Western and Eastern markets and their aggressive economic policies, Czechoslovakia and Hungary appear to be viable candidates for Gateway hinge state status. This thesis explores the potential of Czechoslovakia and Hungary to become hinge states by systematically examining the six attributes outlined by Cohen. The purpose of this study is to determine whether these countries are really viable Gateway hinge state candidates, and if so, to identify the country that shows the greatest promise to achieve actual hinge state status.

Costello, Owen Joseph, Jr. (Ingersoll)

SEP 1992

The Dissident Church: Liberation Theology and Insurgency in Central America, 1965-1992

Liberation theology developed as a consequence of conditions typically found in the developing world but rarely in industrialized and developed countries, specifically the combination of abject poverty and social injustice. The prototype movement emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Latin America, a region where the Catholic Church has historically played an important role in shaping culture and society. During this period, the Church throughout the region experienced a profound transformation and spiritual revitalization, the product of an amalgam of theological, historical, and social factors which reflected contemporary political, economic, and cultural conditions specific to the developing world and to Latin America in particular.

Liberation theology offers the poverty-stricken masses of the developing world practical applications of religious teachings on a broad societal scale. Since its inception, the intellectual independence of some liberation theologians, the use of certain Marxist concepts in the discourse of the movement (particularly the framework of oppressor and oppressed), and the success the movement has found among the politically and economically disenfranchised posed a serious threat not only to the *status quo* of the countries where the movement has prospered, but also to the Vatican hierarchy and to US foreign policy objectives in Latin America during the last decade.

Because of the historical precedents and the continuing influence of Roman Catholicism among the rural poor, the liberation theology movement will continue to endure as an important factor in assessing political and economic conditions throughout Central America. This study examines the direct and indirect support provided by the rural clergy to insurgent groups opposing repressive political regimes in both Guatemala and El Salvador, and participation in the Sandinista government in Nicaragua by several priests identified as advocating the theology of liberation. Both situations ultimately affected US foreign policy objectives in Central America during the 1980s.

Cultural Animosity:**China's Policy Toward Muslims in Xinjiang, Uyghur Autonomous Region**

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the People's Republic of China is of strategic and economic value to the Chinese and historically a region of minority instability. Recent political and religious developments among Muslims in the ex-Soviet Central Asian Republics and the possible spillover of ethnic or religious movements into Xinjiang remain a concern to Chinese authorities.

As the Chinese leadership perceives an increasing threat to its internal stability in Xinjiang, it will continue to attempt to control the Muslim population through strict political and social measures, continual presence of a visible PLA force, and a Xinjiang economy that is intertwined with the economic dynamism of China proper and the Central Asian republics. The research procedure encompasses an examination of the historical and cultural differences between Han and Muslim in Xinjiang within the context of the effectiveness of Party measures in ensuring internal stability and security. The research is supported by regional political, military, historical experts; contemporary scholars are referenced in order to provide a current perspective.

DeCoster, Bryan Donald (Morris)

SEP 1992

An Analysis of OSS Intelligence Estimates:**German Logistics on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942**

This paper analyzes the intelligence success of two estimates published by the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of the Coordinator of Information, the predecessor to the Office of Strategic Services. Tasked by General William J. Donovan in December 1941, the R&A Branch utilized open sources, limited US collection sources, and shared British intelligence information to analyze the German supply problem on the Eastern Front. The R&A Branch published two related estimates on the German supply problem in March and April 1942. Despite limited US collection sources and methods, R&A analysts accurately estimated supply capabilities and requirements of the German Army, reaching six key conclusions.

The two estimates proposed that the German supply problem on the Eastern Front was generally limited to localized disruptions, and that Russian resistance was more decisive in stopping the Germans than was the supply problem. The estimates concluded that the German Army would be much weaker after the winter because of the railroad supply problem, Russian resistance, and poor weather. R&A analysts estimated that the German supply situation would best support an attack in the Caucasus region in 1942.

Approximately 100 copies of the estimates were disseminated to US and British intelligence consumers. General Donovan presented a summary version of the estimates to President Roosevelt. Although it cannot be confirmed that the estimates influenced policymaker decisions, conclusions supported President Roosevelt's decision to commit US forces to Operation TORCH instead of a premature amphibious landing in Western Europe. Most importantly, the organization and methods of the R&A Branch achieved early success in the intelligence community and helped build credibility among policymakers because of the accuracy of estimates such as these.

Degnan, Kevin J. (Morris)

MAY 1992

British Intelligence and the Unraveling of the German Vengeance Weapon Campaign

British intelligence efforts to unravel the Vengeance Weapons campaign during World War II incorporated all intelligence disciplines to identify and defeat the German threat. Through the use of all-source intelligence, the British Secret Intelligence Service (BSIS) successfully identified the emerging threat of the V-1 and V-2 as these German weapons were being developed. This enabled the Allies to interdict production of the Vengeance Weapons, delaying their operational fielding by as much as six months.

This campaign was not a simple intelligence task. It was extremely intensive, with numerous internal disputes within the BSIS and the British War Cabinet. Even though reports of these weapons began to filter into the BSIS as early as September 1939, arguments as to the existence of such weapons continued well into 1943. Although indicators pointed to the existence of the weapons, it was not until June 1943 that the War Cabinet became convinced that the German rocket threat was not a deception plan.

This paper details the unraveling of the German Vengeance Weapon campaign by examining the emergence of the threat, BSIS threat disagreements, the use of all-source intelligence to confirm the threat, and Allied efforts to successfully defeat the threat. Valuable intelligence lessons relevant to the US Intelligence Community today may be derived from this experience.

Ellington, Mark R. (Gross)

AUG 1992

A Luta Continua: Democratization in Mozambique

The formerly Marxist country of Mozambique is continuing the trend of political and economic liberalization which began in the mid-1980s. These changes are a result of a successful insurgency and the government's realization that its socio-economic policies were ill-conceived. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the discreditation of Marxism-Leninism have accelerated the democratization process. But will democracy succeed where communism has failed?

A historical review helps explain the origins of the Mozambican insurgency as well as the ruinous results of collectivization. Democracy is defined and a framework is developed for the Mozambican context. The factors favoring democracy and those opposing its implementation are then examined, followed by speculation on the success of the process. Historical parallels are drawn, when possible, to other developing nations' experiments with democracy.

A distinction is made between democracy and democratization. Mozambique's democratization trend will continue haltingly in the near term, but democracy by any Western standard will not emerge for several generations, if ever. The challenges simply overwhelm the factors favoring democracy. Ultimately, a "liberalized authoritarianism" is the most likely short term product of Mozambique's democratization trend.

Finch, Harold W., Jr. (Ingersoll)

MAY 1992

Haitian Migration in the 1990s

The discovery of 33 bodies on a Miami beach in October 1981 brought national attention to the plight of the unfortunate Haitians attempting to escape the squalor of one of the world's poorest countries. Large scale immigration from Haiti, however, had been occurring for some time prior to 1981, beginning in 1958 with the political opponents of François (Papa Doc) Duvalier fleeing for safety. Since that time, Haiti's political turmoil and destitute economic condition have made control of Haitian migration a continuing problem for US administrations. The September 1991 coup and the resultant mass of migrants fleeing Haiti once again brought the problem to the nation's attention.

Based on research of literature, documents, and interviews with Coast Guard, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Department of State personnel, this thesis will assess the potential for increased Haitian migration to the US during the 1990s. Haitian poverty has been the most enduring factor behind migration, forcing many to migrate to the Dominican Republic and Cuba during the first part of this century. Many still work in the sugar fields of the Dominican Republic. Political repression was the initial motivation during Papa Doc's reign and is still a legitimate claim of many as their primary reason for leaving. Fear forced many to flee after the 1991 coup.

Whatever the reason for leaving Haiti, the amount of emigrants departing for South Florida is significantly influenced by US policy and interdiction efforts. US interdiction operations have proved capable of controlling the flow of migrants no matter how destitute the political and economic conditions in Haiti may be; however, Haitian migration will be a continuing problem in the 1990s.

Traditional Instrumental Counterterrorist Strategies: Do They Work Against Narcoterrorists?

The Extraditables' use of narcoterrorism against the Colombian government to change the extradition policy was the first in the world. The 1979 extradition treaty with the US triggered a "war," pitting the Colombian government against drug organizations. The Medellin Cartel, a grouping of select trafficking organizations, was the primary opponent. The Extraditables, who had the highest chance of being sent to the US, consisted of leaders and select members of these drug organizations.

To decide if an action will be attempted, terrorists compare benefits, costs (including failure), probability of success, and consequences of inaction. Martha Crenshaw proposed two possible responses to instrumental terrorism: defense and deterrence. Defensive measures consist of both passive and offensive measures. Passive defenses, such as guarding potential targets and erecting barriers between potential victim and attacker, were largely unsuccessful. With many motivated assassins and unlimited resources, the Extraditables overwhelmed most passive measures, concentrating resources on one victim while the government was forced to defend a multitude of targets. Offensive measures of preemption and prevention were also ineffective. In preemption, the government strikes when it feels an attack is imminent, thereby stopping an enemy which has already mobilized. The Colombian government seldom acquired timely intelligence to conduct offensive actions. Even if intelligence was acquired, the loss of operational security and the fear of escalation would spoil any action.

Deterrent strategies consist of denial and retaliation. Denial attempts to raise the perceived cost of terrorism. Retaliatory efforts, in the form of crackdowns, enhance the perception that the government will use force to punish terrorists. The Colombian government experienced success using extradition because of its continued effort to enforce legal decisions and the credible threat presented by the US. However, the government's failure to establish a pattern of effective retribution resulted in ineffective retaliatory deterrence. The difficulties in using deterrent strategies included a lack of target focus, failure to enforce, and the potential for escalation.

To defeat these groups in the future, timely and accurate intelligence is critical. By focusing its effort on each group in turn, the government can systematically eliminate narcoterrorism. Better intelligence would help seize the initiative and target the nucleus of narcoterrorism (the drug lords). By eliminating the leadership, narcoterrorist groups face a greater probability of disintegration, making it easier for governments to gain control.

The ULTRA Victory at El Alamein

Superior intelligence is an effective force multiplier and provides tactical as well as strategic advantage. ULTRA intelligence made significant contributions to the defeat of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Panzer Army at the Second Battle of El Alamein. This paper reviews the North African situation through the Battle of Alam Halfa, the contributions of ULTRA intelligence, and the effects on the Panzer Army as seen by expert sources and Field Marshal Rommel.

In the span of a few months, Montgomery defeated the Afrika Korps by waging an intense battle of logistics and attrition. ULTRA continually provided a clear picture of the Axis supply situation. The Allies used ULTRA intelligence to deal critical blows to the North African Luftwaffe contingent and the logistic capability of the Axis. Montgomery's reliance on ULTRA, however, may have resulted in his extreme caution and failure to cut off the retreating Afrika Korps.

The main contributions of ULTRA intelligence can be seen in the preparation phases of the Second Battle of El Alamein. ULTRA was more valuable in confirming the supply situation and force correlation than in planning the British offensive or determining actual enemy locations. Montgomery took advantage of ULTRA intelligence to cut supply lines, drain resources, and reduce the combat force of the Panzer Army. However, ULTRA had difficulty in providing useful and timely information on tactical decisions such as troop movements due to decryption delays. Additionally, Montgomery's dependence on ULTRA information caused him to become more cautious when bolder actions may have resulted in greater success with fewer casualties. Yet, ULTRA intelligence greatly contributed to the Allied victory at El Alamein and served to turn the tide of the war in North Africa and of World War II.

Mt. Pinatubo Eruptions: The Effects on US Strategic Military Interests in the Philippines

The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo has diminished Washington's strategic capabilities in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Falling ash and mudflows have severely damaged the two major US occupied bases and the areas surrounding those bases.

The latest rounds of base negotiations will also have an impact on Washington's strategic capabilities. The aim of these talks is to establish an agreement which will enable the US to continue basing troops and equipment in the Philippines after the Military Bases Agreement expires on 16 September 1991. Soon after the eruptions began, ongoing base negotiations were halted. When negotiations resumed, the US stance had altered to an extent that Washington may be required to seek additional locations to augment or even replace its bases in the Philippines.

The existence of the bases has been established on mutual needs since 1898. Washington needs access to strategically located bases, and Manila depends on the external security protection and financial benefits of the US presence. Until the current negotiations, the US has tolerated a contentious bilateral relationship in order to gain the strategic access that the Philippine bases have provided.

Hearley, Michael D. (Morris)

AUG 1992

Photo Intelligence and Its Impact on the Strategic Bombing Campaign in Europe

Photo intelligence in World War II provided key guidance and information which allowed the Allies to better focus the strategic bombing campaign over Europe. Important target information, including location, type and level of activity, and damage or destruction after bombing raids, was analyzed, enabling bomber force leadership, planners, and crews to carry out the overall objectives of the campaign.

Prior to and during the war, developments in photo intelligence increased its utility. Improvements in collection, interpretation, and reporting gave the field the ability to provide needed information to the bomber force. Reconnaissance pilots were able to fly deep over enemy territory to photograph targets. Interpretation skills and specialties increased in number and effectiveness, and photo interpreters provided detailed target and order of battle information. Reporting provided feedback to planners and leadership who needed the information to plan future missions and establish priorities.

Despite successes in evolution and operation, photo intelligence did have shortfalls. Technical and personal limitations occurred, influencing the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign.

Henstrand, Robert E. (Gordon)

JUN 1992

The Propaganda Campaign of Dr. Prof. Frantisek Jehlicka

From 1933 to 1939, Dr. Prof. Frantisek Jehlicka conducted a propaganda campaign which served the interest of Hungary's policy to regain territories lost after World War I, a policy known as irredentism. His goal was to inspire international support for an independent Slovakia which, exercising national self-determination, would restore its historic and natural geopolitical relationship to Hungary.

The Czechoslovak government considered Jehlicka to be an agent in the employ of Budapest. Though conclusive proof is unavailable, it is highly probable that Jehlicka's propaganda campaign was financed by Hungary. Supporting this allegation are the close parallels among the propaganda of the Slovak Council, Jehlicka's organization, and irredentist Hungary.

As part of their irredentist strategy, Hungary exploited any sympathetic support offered, and in Frantisek Jehlicka, it found a strong ally. As President of the Slovak Council, Jehlicka wrote a series of books which contested the viability of the Czecho-Slovak state. He employed books as the instrument of his propaganda because his target audience included educated, influential people who could and would read his books and contribute international support to his cause. Jehlicka's books contained several consistent themes, including espousing the right of national self-determination of

ethnic groups, rejecting the legitimacy of the Czecho-Slovak state, aggrandizing the support of prominent British champions of Hungarian irredentism, and censuring the Czechs for various despotic actions.

Jehlicka's propaganda was not effective, though, because the governments of the West were diplomatically attuned to the Czechs with whom they had been dealing since before World War I. Jehlicka's propaganda was also ineffective because he was viewed in the West as a recreant cleric. Though not successful in the 1930s, Jehlicka's endeavor may come to fruition in 1992.

Henstrand, Robert E. (Stevens)

APR 1992

A Study of the Ethnicity of the Slovak Nation

For over 1,000 years, Slovakia has existed as a socially and geographically distinct nation, yet it was always politically dominated by other powers. The Kingdom of Hungary subjugated Slovakia until 1918, when it became part of Czechoslovakia under the Czech dominated government. With the exception of a five year period during World War II, Slovakia has never existed as an independent state. Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, Slovakia's national consciousness has regained its fervor. There is a vigorous political movement in Slovakia for increased autonomy within the structure of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, as Czechoslovakia is now officially called.

Too many Americans hold misconceptions about the nature of the Central European state of "Czechoslovakia." Most are unaware that Czechoslovakia is a product of World War I and is composed of three different states: Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. Given the current turbulent and violent situation in post-communist Eastern Europe, it is imperative to understand the exigencies of the region.

In order to formulate an assessment of the current situation, one must appreciate the history and culture of Slovakia and exactly how Slovaks are different from Czechs, Poles, and Slovenes. By examining the geographic, historical, social, and cultural factors peculiar to Slovaks, one quickly observes that Slovaks have a heritage which sustains their claim to nationhood. Survey of the predominant political issues since 1989 provides an understanding of the current situation and direction of Slovakia.

Slovaks are crusading for a level of cultural, economic, and political autonomy appropriate with their perception of their status as a distinct nation. It appears that in 1992 Slovakia will remain part of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic; however, they will continue to prepare for the eventuality that a declaration of independence may become necessary.

Hill, Larry William (Vernon)

SEP 1992

Armenia: Catalyst for NATO Instability

For over 70 years, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic survived under the restraints and protection of the Soviet Union. When communism fell and the USSR disintegrated, Armenia became independent and joined the United Nations. While the world's attention is distracted by communal fighting in the former Yugoslav Republic, conflicts between Armenia and its neighbors go largely unnoticed. Such events could directly affect the US strategically and politically, potentially bringing about the dissolution of NATO and sparking hostilities between Christian Europe and a confederation of Islamic Turkic-speaking republics.

This paper discusses issues connected with Armenia that could affect the stability of NATO and the region. Years of uneasy history have lead to the current relationship between Turkic and Armenian people, including Armenia's relations with the Seljuk Turks, Ottoman Turks, the Republic of Turkey, and the Turkic people of Azerbaijan. Recent Armenian history has included the persecutions of the twentieth century which climaxed in World War I with the modern world's first attempted genocide.

As Minister of Nationalities, Josef Stalin drew the Armenian and Azerbaijan borders to ensure tension. Fighting between the two republics over the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is inside Azerbaijan, has resulted in thousands of casualties in the last two years. Fighting between Armenians and Azeris threatens to involve the Republic of Turkey, which could in turn involve NATO. The likelihood of a pan-Turkic movement and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism among the Central Asian Republics are other issues. The Turkic people of the Central Republics are

predominately Islamic and share Turkic language and heritage. Pan-Turkism and Islamic fundamentalism could have an impact on Armenia, Turkey, and US foreign policy. Additionally, the Armenian diaspora has impacted regional politics and US relations with Turkey. Iranian-Turkish competition for Central Asian leadership is discussed, with ways the US can assist Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey work out their differences.

Hill, Larry William (Potaski)

SEP 1992

Implacable Enemies: Sri Lanka's Tamils and Sinhalese

Sri Lanka, 29 km southeast of India, is a pear-shaped island the size of West Virginia. The Sinhalese and Tamil people have shared this tropical island for over 2500 years. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a Marxist guerilla group fighting the ruling Sinhalese to create a separate Tamil homeland. The Tamil homeland would be called Eelam, and the proposed location is the north and northeastern portions of Sri Lanka. Since 1983, the secessionist movement has claimed over 19,000 lives, mostly Tamil.

Of the island's 17.4 million inhabitants, 74 percent are Sinhalese and 18 percent Tamil. The fact that Sinhalese make up a large portion of the island's population does not keep them from feeling like a threatened minority. Sri Lanka is only 29 km from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, home of 55 million Indian-Tamils. Sinhalese look at the Tamils of India and Sri Lanka as members of the same anti-Sinhalese family. There is some truth to this, as Tamil Nadu provided training camps and military support to Tamil refugees and guerrillas from Sri Lanka.

Sinhalese and Tamils are divided by religion, language, ethnicity, culture, history, and mythology. Since the British granted Sri Lanka independence in 1948, the majority Sinhalese have engaged in seven major anti-Tamil race riots, the worst of which was in 1983. Official figures for the riot reported 400 Tamil deaths; however, unofficial sources put riot related deaths closer to 2000.

The historical and contemporary relationship between Tamils and Sinhalese and the impact of European colonialism are discussed in this paper. The legacy of British rule directly contributed to the rise of Tamil nationalism and modern terrorist groups. In the late 1980s, India negotiated peace between the separatist groups and the Sri Lankan government. To enforce the peace, India sent in a 70,000 member Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF). The peace accord and IPKF were disasters. LTTE took advantage the peace to eliminate competitors and then turned on IPKF. The Sri Lankan government ordered IPKF out, and Sinhalese Security Forces took over. Fighting between Sinhalese and Tamil forces continues with the Sinhalese slowly winning the war.

Hudgins, Audrey D. (Swenson)

SEP 1992

Intelligence and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Since the development of the atomic bomb, the global community has been confronted with the problem of nuclear proliferation. After many years of debate and negotiation, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) emerged as the compromise international institution, charged with promoting growth and development of atomic energy and preventing diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use.

Public disclosure of Iraq's nuclear weapons program eroded international confidence in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Export control groups reacted quickly to close gaps exploited by Iraq. Altering the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 to strengthen it, however, would open Pandora's box; the result would only be a weaker, less effective international agreement. Perhaps most importantly, IAEA emerged from the Iraqi challenge a much more astute institution. Although the use of shared foreign intelligence was fraught with problems and difficulties as employed in Iraqi inspections, this information emerged as the key to ensuring success in international nonproliferation efforts. IAEA's traditional hesitation to use intelligence was overcome as the benefits became apparent. In the future, IAEA will adapt to the new role information plays in its operation.

The international intelligence environment was reconditioned as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the Gulf War. The Open Skies treaty defines the role for intelligence in a multinational effort. The Western European Union embodies a history of collective security developments as it evolves into the security arm of the European Community. The Vienna Document sets a new standard for data exchange in its role as a confidence and security building measure.

The US Intelligence Community, however, is still attempting to define its role in a changing security environment. In areas where the US and global community share similar interests, the US must choose to release relevant intelligence. The experience in Iraq has shown foreign intelligence sharing to be an important means to the successful implementation of the elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Hunsinger, Tonda A. (Swenson)

AUG 1992

The Rise of Neo-Nazism

The reemergence of Neo-Nazi, right-wing extremist movements in the 1990s is an indication of complex societal conditions within the geopolitical environment. This examination of the rise of the Neo-Nazi phenomenon focuses on societal conditions, the role of a messianic personality, and the tools used to convey the messianic message. Societal conditions, such as unmet expectations growing out of a previously robust economy and a characteristic type and level of formal education, must be present for any type of right-wing exploitation to occur.

The messianic personality is always in search of an audience. If there is not a dissatisfied group to exploit, the messianic personality and his message cannot grow into a mass movement. The tools of messianic personality in the Neo-Nazi movement consist of racism, racial scapegoats, racial hatred, fear, and the media. Today's Neo-Nazi movements in Europe focus on the latest wave of economic and political immigrants as the object of their racial hatred. Neo-Nazi groups in South Africa focus their racism on the unravelling of the institutional separation of races.

This study explores the conditions, personalities, and tools behind the Nazi movement of Adolf Hitler; present day right-wing extremists like Jean Marie LePen in France and Eugene Terre Blanche in South Africa; and the internationalist racism of Rev. Sun Myung Moon and The Unification Church. Neo-Nazi movements of the 1990s are creating instability and possibly radical change for some legitimate governments. A consolidated Neo-Nazi movement is unlikely to emerge because of the specific nationalistic focus of each country examined here. The rise of Neo-Nazism is a reflection of deeper societal frustrations which need to be addressed if the spread of this phenomenon is to be contained.

Hunsinger, Tonda A. (Vernon)

SEP 1992

Winter 1993 in Russia

The fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet economy in 1991 created great concern among western nations. Some feared that potential for food shortages and famine through the harsh Russian winter would destroy the beginnings of democracy, inviting a return to authoritarian rule. Fortunately, the predicted famine did not occur. Some areas and state-owned stores experienced shortages, but private markets had food at higher prices, and hoarding got most of the population through winter. Last year's shortages revealed pre-existing problems in food production, supply, and distribution which were exacerbated by the collapse of the command economic system. This paper focuses on those problems, solutions the Russians used to get through the winter, and potential problems they face in the winter of 1993. Key factors are privatization, waste, and the valueless ruble. Solutions that emerged included hoarding, private garden plots, and the barter economy.

The agricultural sector has always experienced shortages in fuel, equipment, and manpower. This year, those shortages are compounded by much higher costs. The most significant problem is the collapse of the central food distribution system. The command economy can no longer demand food supplies into the central system. Farmers are choosing when, where, and how to sell their goods, leaving centralized distribution paralyzed. The dissolution of the Soviet Union also left the transportation system fragmented among the republics, further adding to the chaos of the harvest. Relationships between the republics will have an impact on the availability of food and its transit to other areas.

Is there a danger of famine in Russia for winter 1993? Most likely not. The depth of the problems caused by the collapse of the command economy and the central distribution system is unfolding daily. Agricultural problems combined with the failing economy, unstable republic relationships, and the potential for violence or political and domestic instability due to disappointment over the slow and painful progress of radical reforms may, however, lead to domestic unrest this winter.

Saudi Arabia's Minorities: The Expatriates

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as religious center of the Islamic world, has long attempted to isolate itself from non-Islamic influences. This includes near exclusion of foreigners, especially non-Muslims, except for those necessary to build, operate, and maintain Saudi Arabia's growing industry and infrastructure, and the repression of any public worship other than Islam. Culturally, Saudis disdain physical or menial labor, forcing them to rely upon foreigners to do mundane work whenever possible. Contract workers, known collectively as expatriates, comprise up to 25 percent of the population and up to 75 percent of the workforce. No matter how vital they are to the Saudi economy, the expatriates have traditionally been isolated from the Saudi community, live in foreign compounds, are subject to harassment by the religious police, and are treated as third-class persons or even non-persons.

Saudi Arabia, as much as it would like to do so, is incapable of functioning without a large expatriate community to provide the technical and professional expertise the Kingdom so badly needs. On the other hand, the Kingdom is unwilling to give up the traditional way of living in accordance with the laws of the Quran. The Saudis fear their traditional way of life is directly threatened by the presence and unwanted influence of the expatriates.

The unprecedented influx of foreigners during the Persian Gulf conflict forced the Saudis to reexamine their policies toward foreign presence. Recent events indicate Saudi Arabia is increasing unofficial repression of western expatriates and is beginning to replace both non-Saudi Arabs and non-western foreigners with Muslims from South and East Asia.

This paper examines the dilemma faced by Saudi Arabia: its desire to exclude foreigners and non-Islamic influences against the need for foreign assistance and manpower in building the domestic infrastructure. The expatriates, recruiting methods, and living and working conditions in Saudi Arabia are discussed. Official and unofficial policies toward expatriates, human and civil rights, and the impact of the Gulf conflict are addressed. The Kingdom's reaction to the increased presence of US military personnel in country and the Gulf and the effect on the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States is analyzed.

Kaczmar, Stephen R. (Parchomenko)

DEC 1991

Soviet Military Reform: A Function of the Union and Resources

Since coming to power in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev has been the catalyst for the most substantial changes in Soviet society since the onset of communism. These changes have rapidly accelerated as a result of the failed August 1991 coup.

A key component of Gorbachev's reform involves redirecting resources from the military to the remainder of the economy. To facilitate this, Gorbachev managed to substantially decrease East-West threat perceptions through various confidence building measures. As a more democratic and less threatening Soviet Union evolves, the need for massive military spending by both superpowers diminishes. Gorbachev has begun redirecting resources into the civilian segments of Soviet society. Despite these efforts, improvements have been marginal at best.

The Soviets are attempting to reform a massive, quantitative military into a smaller, qualitative one in an effort to meet the new reasonable sufficiency security needs of the Soviet Union. To achieve this goal, adequate resources are critical for implementing military reform. In the past, the largest portion of the military budget was acquisition, which is now shrinking. How other segments of the military budget will be altered remains to be seen. Research and development, as well as maintenance and operational requirements must continue to be met if the Soviets intend to have a modern warfighting capability.

This study examines the Soviet military in light of the August 1991 events. Soviet military reform will require substantial resources. Two factors control the availability of these resources and will determine how far and fast Soviet military reform will go. First, union must be preserved, even if only a loose confederation of independent republics. Without a union, the Soviets will lack the collective resources to transform and maintain a high quality modern military. Second, despite certain expectations by the Soviet populace and politicians of a "peace dividend," resources must permit the implementation of military reform. Without substantial resources to equip, pay, quarter, and retain a professional military, the transition from conscript to professional force will slow down or even stop entirely.

The Chernobyl Syndrome

Soviet leadership from Stalin to Gorbachev did not adequately protect Soviet citizens from actual or potential nuclear contamination. This paper reviews a wide range of nuclear issues, concentrating on the Chernobyl AES explosion, its aftermath, and government and public response to the accident. Reviews are included of similar accidents and situations which may have been prevented if appropriate safety precautions were taken by the Soviet government. Two such examples are the 1957 Kyshtym explosion and the contamination of Karachay Lake.

Other nuclear related issues included are government efforts to help people living on contaminated soil or otherwise affected by nuclear accidents, inadequacies in Soviet enforcement of nuclear laws and regulations, shortcomings in construction of nuclear plants, and the recent effects of glasnost and public involvement in nuclear issues.

In spite of the historical breakup of the Soviet Union, the world community must not assume that these problems will automatically be corrected. New countries which contain fragments of the former Soviet nuclear industry have also inherited their share of the nuclear problem. The health of their citizens and citizens of other countries may depend on their willingness to correct a problem-ridden industry. The new countries of the former Soviet Union face many immediate problems, and an overhaul of the nuclear industry is likely a low priority. The world community must continue to insist that nuclear safety become a priority.

Konchan, Charles E. (Parchomenko)

OCT 1991

The KGB and Perestroika

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of perestroika on the KGB and gauge KGB commitment to reforms. Both the government and the KGB have initiated reforms since Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in March 1985. Such reforms include new thinking on the rule of law state, removing the KGB from Party subordination, and requiring the KGB to document operational guidelines (draft law). Reforms instituted by the KGB include publishing an information bulletin concerning KGB activities, rehabilitating victims of Stalin's purges, and investigating and punishing KGB participants in Stalinist atrocities. This document covers material available prior to the August 1991 coup attempt.

Reform trends and circumstances within the Soviet Union prior to the coup attempt are assessed. The KGB recently has undergone painful changes, notably, the prosecution and punishment of members of their own organization for past abuses, and erosion of the KGB's elite status. The Soviet government has clearly supported and nurtured political and social trends, suggesting the changes are *bona fide* attempts to correct past failings of both the government and the KGB. Due to events of August 1991, it is likely these reforms will rapidly accelerate.

Koneff, Douglas A. (Kauppi)

JAN 1992

The Conflicting Pressures of Interdependence and Unilateralism on International Negotiations: A Case Study of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam Dispute

The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam dispute concerns a hydroelectric project conceived in communism and dedicated to the proposition that all benefits are created equal. Largely supported by Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary through most of its planning and implementation, GNV is now a contentious environmental, economic, ethnic, and political issue in the changed reality of post-communist central and eastern Europe.

The benefits of the project's original objectives (energy, navigation, and flood control) are now questioned by Hungarians and environmentalists concerned about maintaining Danube water quality and preserving the ecological integrity of the basin. Many Slovaks and Czechs, however, feel the benefits of completing the project outweigh perceived environmental effects. Moreover, the lifting of Soviet dominance over the region has released long-suppressed ethno-nationalist forces, complicating attempts to resolve this international dispute. As a result, the

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam has become the greatest source of tension between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. At its heart, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute is an environmental issue, one which recognizes the interdependent nature of the Danube Basin. Incentives to cooperate, however, are being challenged by unilateral forces. Hungarian sensitivity to its minorities abroad and Slovakian desires for greater autonomy within the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic are issues which cause mistrust and obfuscate efforts to find common interests. GNV negotiations would proceed further if more cooperative, integrated bargaining measures were employed.

Bringing all parties to the table would ensure that each group with interests in the project could be heard. Scientific uncertainty over the environmental effects of GNV would be reduced if a neutral and independent third party were appointed. Separating issues from interests would help the negotiating parties discern areas of agreement and disagreement and provide opportunities for creative bargaining. In the end, the success or failure of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros negotiations will depend upon the ability of decisionmakers to match such cooperative measures with their own independent, unilateral objectives.

Kruse, Michael D. (Ingersoll)

SEP 1992

Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement

Following the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and more than 70 years of statism, Mexico, like other Latin American countries, is entering into the modern world of capitalism and privatization. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has moved his nation further ahead economically than any of Mexico's previous presidents. Perhaps Salinas' most radical move to date was proposing a free trade agreement with the United States.

After finding little enthusiasm in Western Europe for broadening ties with Mexico, Salinas proposed opening talks on a free trade agreement with the United States. Both the Mexican and US governments were enthusiastic over the prospect of erasing tariffs and other barriers to the movement of products, services, and money. Canada also requested to be included in an accord which will create the world's largest free trade zone.

The agreement was finalized in Washington, DC, on 12 August 1992 but is not expected to be presented to lawmakers for ratification until September. Congress will have 90 days to work with the administration to draft implementing legislation. Using a special "fast-track" handling procedure, Congress will then have another 90 working days to approve or disapprove the package with no amendments allowed. Ratification is not expected before early 1993.

This paper will address the background of Mexico's economic revival, major elements of the agreement itself, and issues relating to industry, investments, services, property rights, and agriculture. Discussion on the North American Free Trade Agreement will focus on the contributions it will make to the continent and to Mexico in particular.

Laliberte, Daniel A. (Hunter)

OCT 1991

An Estimate of the Likelihood of Another Mariel-Style Cuban Exodus by Sea

The possibility of another Mariel-style exodus of refugees from Cuba is of major concern to the US government. Cuba is experiencing severe shortages of consumer goods, food, fuel, electrical power, and machinery parts. The Council for Mutual Economic Advancement (CMEA), which formerly accounted for 85 percent of Cuba's foreign trade, has been dissolved. Although Cuba is attempting to develop alternate markets and sources of supply and to expand tourism, its economic difficulties are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. With the usual trickle of illegal refugees having swelled to over 1000 per month, the current economic, political, and social conditions in Cuba are very similar to those in the months prior to the 1980 Mariel Boatlift.

A three step process is used to determine the likelihood of another exodus. First, the history of Cuba, with emphasis on migration, is examined. Particular attention is paid to large scale migration since Fidel Castro's takeover in 1958. From this background, an analysis of the current situation is made. Three plausible future scenarios are postulated, with accompanying indicators. The second step involves development of a causal loop diagram. This diagram identifies the variables affecting the probability of an exodus, and diagrammatically shows their relationships. The most important causal variables are selected from the causal loop diagram to construct a probability tree diagram in the third step of the process.

From the probability tree diagram, an overall probability of 51.3 percent is calculated for the likelihood of another mass exodus by sea in the next one to two years. Various policy options that could affect this probability are discussed. While some options, such as economic aid, could reduce the likelihood to a very low level, most are politically unpalatable. Successful application of the most likely US course of action, that of taking steps to reinforce the extent of the perception by the Cuban government that the US is resolved and prepared to oppose a boatlift, could lower the probability to 45.1 percent.

Lepper, Nathan A. (Gordon)

AUG 1992

Towards a New Security System for East Europe

Eastern Europe faces a long and difficult road as it strives to rejoin the rest of Europe and the global community. In the midst of major economic and social problems threatening already weak democracies, these societies are also trying to cope with a security vacuum left by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. While addressing this situation through internal reforms and changes, the Eastern leaders desire substantial military and economic aid from the West and integration with Western security structures.

Of the structures and organizations being discussed for integrating Eastern Europe into a larger pan-European security apparatus, East Europeans have looked increasingly to NATO as the most logical alternative, at least for the foreseeable future. Governments have made substantial progress in reforming their armed forces but still desire NATO integration in conjunction with membership in other major organizations, such as the European Community, in order to assure long term security and prosperity. Interlocking institutions, which draw upon the strengths of various organizations to address the multifaceted aspects of security, are being discussed more frequently.

In reality, NATO membership for the East is most likely years away, given the extent of the region's problems. A more practical alternative may be a bilateral defense agreement between NATO and the new democracies, assuring these states of NATO's committed interest in their defense. In the meantime, East European militaries will likely complete the redeployment of their forces to reflect defensive postures, restructuring efforts as they strive to transform their services to reflect Western democratic norms. Development of bilateral relationships within Eastern Europe as well as with Western nations will also be further pursued as the best probable means to ensure security before any formal arrangement can be established with NATO.

Without significant Western aid, many leaders as well as analysts of the region fear prospects for a successful transition to democracy. Integration into NATO will be limited. Eastern Europe's increased involvement and possible eventual integration with Western security systems may also be crucial for security throughout Europe. Consequently, many experts on the region believe Western aid and assistance is critical not only for the East, but for the world as a whole.

Light, Giles A. (Ingersoll)

SEP 1992

Privatization in Latin America: Chile, Mexico, and Argentina Leading the Way

Privatization of state-owned enterprises is a key component of the drive for modernization and renewed growth in Latin America. This has been spurred by a number of events taking place in individual countries and through the support of forces beyond their borders. In a number of countries throughout the region, governments came to realize the role they played in the production of goods and services within their borders was too large. Beyond the borders of Latin America, privatization is an idea widely supported by the US government, primarily the Agency for International Development, and other international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Three countries in Latin America, Chile, Mexico, and Argentina, have achieved the most success in reforming their economies and privatizing state-owned enterprises. This success can be measured by looking at changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that have occurred since reforms were instituted. Other measures of economic success, such as lowered inflation levels, increased employment, reduced foreign debt, rising equity markets, return of capital, and movement towards free trade, show similar results. Finally, public opinion polls and recent elections in each country provide popular support for the reforms taking place.

The successes of Chile, Mexico, and Argentina provide examples which other countries in Latin America might follow if they wish to modernize and achieve economic growth. Since many of these countries have similar historical experiences, it would not be surprising if their economic reforms produced similar results. Venezuela, Brazil, and Uruguay have taken initial steps at reforming their economies. Colombia and Bolivia, have made public statements supporting these reforms. Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama have yet to begin economic reform and privatization.

Loncar, Mark L. (Gordon)

JUL 1992

Democracy in the Making: Solidarity and Polish Politics Since 1989

The Solidarity trade union outlasted seven years of martial law to ignite the sparks of democracy in Poland. At the Round Table negotiations of 1989, Solidarity and the ruling communists agreed to hold the first free elections in Eastern Europe since World War II. After the negotiations, however, Solidarity fragmented into a broad array of political parties that has led to parliamentary gridlock and successively weak governments. This fragmentation was nevertheless inevitable and will in the longer term force Solidarity's political offspring to compromise with each other and form broader, more stable, parliamentary and government coalitions.

This coalition building process, which was ongoing as of May 1992, will be aided with the passage of a new election law in Poland reducing the number of parties represented in parliament. In the interim, the major political parties must be more willing to compromise to ensure the parliamentary support necessary to pass a new election law, as well as a new constitution to better delineate the roles and powers of the branches of Polish government. The Solidarity banner may be rolled up and put away, but until these tasks are accomplished, Solidarity's vision of a stable democracy in Poland remains to be carried out.

Loncar, Mark L. (Pieragostini)

AUG 1992

The Suez Crisis: US Intelligence Support to Policy

US intelligence support to policymakers during the Suez Crisis of 1956 resulted in a mixed record. The Intelligence Community produced comprehensive estimates on the crisis and the events leading up to it. These estimates, despite many accurate conclusions, contained flawed analysis that ill-served policymakers, especially as the crisis neared its climax in war on 29 October 1956.

During the critical month of October 1956, US intelligence did not produce an estimate on the situation. Intelligence warning that war was imminent, however, did give policymakers enough time to make attempts to preclude hostilities and make adjustments to US policy statements. The warning provided by intelligence was tactical in nature because the aggressors in the war, Britain, France, and Israel, planned late; the two European allies cut off information; and the Israelis practiced deception. Attempts, therefore, to label US intelligence performance during the Suez Crisis period a strategic failure are overstated, as are statements by then Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles that the Intelligence Community was above reproach.

Loneman, David R. (Harris)

DEC 1991

The Royal Navy into the 1990s: A Medium Power Navy Confronting a Time of Change

The United Kingdom is allowing its navy to wither away. The 1990s will see all elements of the Royal Navy cut below the minimum numbers required to support and defend British national interests. The *Statement on the Defense Estimates - 1991* made it very clear that London could and would no longer be able to afford both the British Army of the Rhine and a large power projection navy. All three armed services lost a great deal in the political and economic sacrifices of 1991. The end of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet threat in 1990-1991, at least for now, helped British policymakers during the budget-cutting process.

There will be far fewer surface ships, submarines, and aircraft in the Royal Navy by the mid-1990s. The remaining ships will be modern and capable of dealing with most of the threats they will face, but only barely. The numbers are not available to allow the UK to again conduct an independent, aggressive foreign policy. The maritime defense of Britain and British national interests in the 1990s must now rely upon decisive and early American intervention or a united European and military response.

Mastriano, Douglas V. (Gross)

SEP 1992

Saddam Husein, Iraqi Strategy, and the Second Persian Gulf War: A Study in an Illegitimate Leader's Strategy

When Iraqi tanks poured across the Kuwaiti border on 2 August 1990, the world was reminded that peace is very fragile. The invasion gave Saddam Husein control of significant oil reserves, promising to make Iraq an economic superpower. However, with the leadership of the United States, the United Nations responded to Iraq's aggression. As a formidable Coalition assembled in the Gulf, Saddam vainly tried to achieve legitimacy for his invasion and occupation of Kuwait. During the political showdown that preceded the Coalition attack, Iraq bolstered its military force arrayed in Kuwait to thwart a US-led offensive.

Despite this, the Coalition launched a devastating attack to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait shortly after the 15 January 1991 UN-imposed deadline passed. After only 100 hours of warfare, Iraq was completely defeated and Kuwait's sovereignty restored. In the aftermath of the war, Iraq was torn asunder by two civil wars. As Loyalist forces battled to hold Iraq together, Saddam shrewdly consolidated power and remained in command.

The search for legitimacy and the struggle for political survival characterize both Iraq's history and Saddam's rule, especially since the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. This thesis analyzes why Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait, how he tried to attain political legitimacy before the Coalition attack, and the implications of Baghdad's illegitimacy on both domestic and regional affairs. This analysis provides a framework to understand what influences and motivates the actions of illegitimate leaders who are desperately trying to survive politically.

McIntyre, Thomas J. (Belbutowski)

JUN 1992

The Japanese Space Program: With or Without the US

The Japanese space program is understood by Americans as minor, due to its small budget, slow progress, and small scale, which do not match American expectations. Japan has, however, carefully developed a national space infrastructure and high technology for future leadership in space. Drawing on such cultural and national strengths as long term vision and cooperative spirit, as well as a directed economy, Japan has established a foundation capable of supporting significant growth in its space endeavors.

Japanese plans for guiding the space program include fostering private sector involvement in space and seeking opportunities to gain profit in aerospace in general. At a time when the US and former USSR are either marginally enhancing or diminishing their space programs, Japan's program continues growing steadily. The US must remain vital and competitive in aerospace or lose not only market dominance and economic stature but the ability to project military power world-wide. Failure to take advantage of Japan's partnership in space may cause the US to be ultimately eclipsed.

McMeans, Linda H. (Stevens)

SEP 1992

Race and Instability in Fiji

Racial discrimination and political struggles in the last decade over the rights of indigenous people have caused two military coups and a drain of talented traders and skilled professionals from Fiji. Land is probably the most significant factor in the Fijian-Indian conflict. Fijians consider land ownership part of their heritage and identity. Since

a system of traditional communal tenure prohibits most private ownership by non-Fijians, Fijians own about 83 percent of the land, the government about seven percent, and non-Fijians another ten. Indians, who comprise 46 percent of the population and own only 1.7 percent of the land, are tenants and subtenants who depend on Fijians for leased land.

Few societies exhibit a more marked degree of institutional separation between the major population segments than does Fiji. The population includes native Fijians and Fijian citizens of Indian ancestry (laborers imported to maintain the plantation economy). For decades, the government discouraged Fijian business initiative by socializing them as communalistic villagers and supplying most of their needs, while enterprising Indians filled the entrepreneurial void.

From 1946 to 1989, the Indian population exceeded the Fijian, and an Indian-backed party came to power for the first time in 1987. Two military coups the same year deposed the short-lived Indian-dominated government and precipitated massive Indian emigration, leaving them a minority on the islands. Emigration continues, and those who leave are mainly professionals, skilled tradesmen, and their families. If the exodus of Indians is not stopped, Fiji could face a dangerous void in the labor pool.

Political instability will continue unless inter-racial cooperation is achieved. No resolution is foreseen given the social and economic divisions established along racial lines and in place for over a century. Indians see little chance of ending racial discrimination and will be forced to continue their peaceful struggle.

Mihalas, Phyllis J. (Harris)

MAR 1992

A Mediterranean Feud: Greece and Turkey

The development of the disputes between Greece and Turkey owe much to the long history of grievance and mistrust between the two nations. The deep-rooted ethnic, cultural, and religious differences between Greece and Turkey are embodied in three intractable disputes: the Cyprus question, the issue of sovereignty in the Aegean, and the remilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands.

Since the 1950s, Cyprus has been the major issue driving a wedge between Greece and Turkey. By population and by heritage, Cyprus is overwhelmingly Greek but has never been part of Greece. It has a Turkish minority but was ruled by Turkey for three centuries. Cyprus presents an intractable problem in which bitter historical memory has superseded the desire of its people for a harmonious future.

The Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey centers on the delineation of sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea. These disputes involved rival claims over the continental shelf (which supposedly contains valuable oil and mineral deposits), territorial waters and airspace, and the remilitarization of the East Aegean Islands. The determination of maritime boundaries is complex, especially with the unusual geographic configurations of the involved islands.

During the course of the Greco-Turkish dispute over the Aegean maritime and airspace matters during 1974-1975, a perennial concern reemerged: the remilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands. This issue touches concerns of sovereignty as well as national security issues for both nations.

It would be easier for the two neighbors to find mutually acceptable formulas for the resolution of conflicts, but the historical baggage of animosity and suspicion has been instrumental in ushering in a period of estrangement and conflict. Many studies have appeared, particularly on the Cyprus conflict, but there is a lack of comprehensive studies in English of the full range of contemporary Greco-Turkish disputes. This paper discusses such issues.

Millar, Richard H. (Stevens)

MAY 1992

East Timor: Road to Integration with Indonesia

East Timor has been politically and ethnically separate from Indonesia for more than 400 years. Through the centuries, the Archipelago has been under a multitude of tribal and religious influences. Indonesia is predominately Muslim, while a majority of the Timorese are Christian. European colonial influences began in the 1500s and continued until 1975 when the Portuguese left East Timor. Later in 1975, the Indonesian government sent military units into East Timor and claimed it as its 27th province, thus beginning an Indonesian policy of integration of East Timor.

It has been 17 years since the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. However, despite Indonesian military, political, and economic efforts to integrate East Timor, discontent within East Timor has continued at varying levels since 1975.

The most recent incident occurred in November 1991 when an estimated 150 demonstrators were killed by the Indonesian Army during an anti-government rally in the East Timor capital of Dili. This most recent bloodshed raises the question of whether the people of East Timor will accept full integration with Indonesia.

Indonesia has made noble efforts politically, socially, and economically to integrate East Timor. Indonesia's most serious weakness to integration is the heavy-handed tactics employed by its military units stationed in East Timor. The November 1991 incident highlights Indonesia's central problem to integration. To be successful and have the people of East Timor accept integration, the Indonesian government must continue to improve living conditions of the Timorese, maintain freedom of religion, encourage participation in the political process, and reduce the military aggression.

Mulligan, Kevin (Parchomenko)

MAY 1992

Soviet Military Compliance with Gorbachev's New Political Thinking

Gorbachev's new political thinking during 1985-91 allowed the USSR to focus maximum attention on its internal problems, both economic and social, by dramatically altering its traditional foreign policy conduct. Three fundamental precepts of new thinking were especially relevant to the Soviet military: the USSR must prevent war rather than prepare for war; arms control is essential; and the arms race must end.

This paper examines the military's compliant attitude toward new thinking. It analyzes speeches and articles by then senior spokesmen of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, primarily Akhromeev, Moiseev, Yazov, Gareev, and Ogarkov. As Gorbachev grew more liberal, opening the entire defense agenda to public debate, he inflamed conservatives and hardliners. Senior military leaders, however, always understood that new thinking, as an outgrowth of horrific economic reality, was in fact their only hope.

The points of greatest stress for the military in 1990-91, ending with the August coup, are outlined. New thinking spawned new attitudes toward arms control negotiations, all of which seemed to hinge on Soviet concessions. The continuing US threat, embodied especially in the successful use of precision guided weapons in the Persian Gulf and in the avowed need to further strengthen NATO, also created tension in the Soviet military's compliance with new thinking.

Nakasone, Paul M. (Blake)

DEC 1991

Research and Analysis Branch: The Birth of American Strategic Intelligence

Intelligence possesses its own aura. To the outsider, the profession encompasses covert operations, double agents, secrecy, and spies. Many amateur intelligence observers focus on dangerous and glamorous escapades, so often highlighted in today's books, films, and television shows. Conversely, for the painstaking process of intelligence research and analysis, few give more than short shrift to its importance. Unlike his operations counterparts, the intelligence analyst enjoys no romantic legacy.

World War II generated a need for a professional American intelligence community. The Coordinator for Information and its subsequent transformation into the Office of Strategic Services served this need. These agencies were America's first attempt at a coordinated intelligence system. The greatest success story to come out of these organizations was a little known branch, Research and Analysis (R&A). R&A brought on the development of American strategic intelligence capability. Described by some present day scholars as the humanists' and social scientists' version of the Manhattan Project, R&A offered several wartime contributions, but its wartime legacy pales in comparison to its post-war successes.

With the birth of American strategic intelligence, R&A offered proof that a regular, central intelligence system was of value to American policymakers. It trained numerous scholars, statesmen, and intelligence experts whose work shaped both the academic and intelligence community in post-war America. Research and Analysis branch, though never garnering the publicity of other agencies, remains one of the greatest wartime success stories.

Palestinians: A People or a Pawn?

Arabs have long asserted that it is the Palestinian people's birthright to have an independent state (homeland). This is based on the claim that the land now occupied by the modern state of Israel is the Palestinian people's ancestral homeland. One of the tactics Arabs have used in pursuit of the goal of a Palestinian state is the claim of Palestinian ethnicity. The Arab world began calling for the destruction of Israel in 1948 but found little international support. In the late 1970s, the tactics were changed when many, including Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat, began stating that the main issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict was not the existence of Israel, but the absence of a Palestinian state. This issue has become the focal point of hostilities between the Arab states and Israel.

This paper examines how Arabs have used an appeal to the principal of ethnicity in an attempt to regain control of the area now called Israel. It looks at the Arab claim that the Palestinians are an ethnic group separate from other Arab peoples, and therefore do not belong in any of the current Arab nation-states. This paper does not consider the question of whether ethnic groups have an inherent right to self-determination.

Palestinian nationalism apparently did not exist until after the end of the June 1967 war. This observation is well supported by statements made by Arab leaders over the years. For example, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser stated in 1956 and reiterated in 1970 that "the imperialists' destruction of Palestine" was "an attack on Arab nationalism," which "unites us from the Atlantic to the Gulf." The lack of Palestinian nationalism prior to the late 1960s is also evidenced by how newspapers reported on the issue. Articles on the Palestinian question began to surface in newspapers in the early 1960s, but referred to Palestinians as either "Palestine refugees" or "Arab refugees." Palestinians were still referred to as Arabs or Bedouins until the early 1970s. There is, however, little or no evidence that the Palestinians are in fact a separate ethnic group from other Arabs, and they may merely be a pawn in the Arab war against Israel's existence.

Powell, René Frame (Gross)

MAY 1992

Israel's Options for Settling the Palestinian Problem

Two sets of people lay claim to the same land in Palestine: the Israelis and the Palestinians. Israel is a portion of Palestine; the remaining areas are controlled by Israel and are termed "the Territories." Palestinians live within Israel's borders, the Israeli-controlled territories, and also live outside the territory they claim, actively and fervently working to gain possession. Domestically, this issue is an economic, social, and moral problem for Israel. The issue also impacts negatively on Israel's international relations.

Israel has numerous options available to settle the problem. This thesis provides analysts with a tool to weigh a variety of factors that impinge on Israeli decision-making regarding the Palestinian problem and to help predict Israeli actions. It includes a history of the dispute, explains several options available to Israel in dealing with the Palestinian problem, and details the factors influencing an Israeli decision. The options are compared in a tabular form.

Some form of withdrawal from the Territories would be the most likely option for Israel to choose were it actively seeking a rapid settlement of the Palestinian problem. The current Likud-led Israeli government appears reluctant to select this option and appears to prefer instead the *status quo* (no war, no peace). More painful options are available, and factors other than purely "rational" ones govern current Israeli decisionmaking.

Price, Carl Edward (Ingersoll)

AUG 1992

Brazil's Space Quest: Does It Have a Future?

In 1987, Brazil began the quest for an indigenous space program called the Complete Brazilian Space Mission (MECB). Since then, the program has been slowly moving towards accomplishing its three goals: placing an indigenously produced satellite into low earth orbit; using a Brazilian manufactured Satellite Launch Vehicle; and launching from a Brazilian built and controlled space center.

The ultimate goal of MECB is a space industry that will further Brazil's economic and political aspirations, development of natural resources, and advancement of its technological and industrial base. One reason Brazil embarked on a space venture was to capture a share of the commercial launching revenues and small satellite manufacturing to improve its ailing economy. This, however, has proven not to be the case; in fact, at the current rate of development, Brazil could not capture a large enough share of the commercial market to pay for its research. However, Brazil could make up the amount invested and make substantial gains if it were to market ballistic missiles. Given Brazil's past weapons trading partners and this opportunity, the US and other Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members see a potentially explosive situation building.

A better comprehension of MECB can be gained by reviewing its development, MTCR and its application to Brazil's program, Brazil's ballistic missile capability, and recent events which have put new life into the program. Brazil's space future depends on its ability to bypass MTCR restrictions, develop an indigenous space infrastructure, reduce its foreign debt, and enter into joint space agreements with other countries.

Brazil will continue with a space program, although there will be few economic benefits, and the country will gain little other than prestige and national pride. By continuing with the development of a satellite launching vehicle, Brazil will develop a medium to intercontinental range ballistic missile capability.

Quinn, Robert C. (Ingersoll)

SEP 1992

At the Mercy of Supply and Demand: The Arms Industries of Brazil and Argentina

The arms industries of Brazil and Argentina are the two largest in Latin America. Due to unprecedented changes occurring in the world in the last few years and with regards to internal concerns, arms industries in both countries are undergoing a period of extreme change and dislocation. This paper will compare the conventional arms industries of Brazil and Argentina, covering industry's evolution, assessing current export potential, and projecting viability through the end of the 1990s.

The areas of concern will be limited to small aircraft, medium and lightweight armored vehicles, and small arms and munitions. Selected equipment and contractors will be discussed as examples of the overall industry. In a late 1990 meeting at Foz D'Iguaçu, both governments pledged not to pursue either nuclear or chemical-biological weapons; therefore, these areas will not be discussed.

Quinn, Robert C. (Morris)

AUG 1992

OP-20-G and the Destruction of the Japanese Merchant Marine Fleet, 1941-1945

OP-20-G was the communications intelligence (COMINT), cryptography, and security organization for the US Navy in 1941. After US entry into World War II on 7 December 1941, OP-20-G increased from 60 personnel to a worldwide network of over 5000 with responsibility for US naval COMINT in both the European and Pacific Theaters.

Japan, a series of islands, depended upon importation of natural resources and food via a merchant marine and tanker fleet. The key US weapon against these fleets were the submarines of Submarine Force Pacific (SUBPAC). SUBPAC damaged more of the merchant fleets than carrier and land-based aircraft or surface ships combined, sinking over 60 percent of all Japanese shipping during the war. The success of SUBPAC also depended upon a number of factors, including operations, logistics, and intelligence.

This paper traces the evolution and organization of OP-20-G and its interface with operations. The affect of OP-20-G COMINT on submarine operations and its success is discussed using the January to October 1943 period as a case study. COMINT reporting was definitely an important aid to locating the Japanese merchant shipping. While locating targets was an important factor, it cannot be characterized as decisive. Other factors in the operational and logistical areas were also of great importance. COMINT reporting was only one very critical part of the system used to slowly strangle Japanese supply lines.

Low Intensity Conflict in Kashmir

Low intensity conflict in Kashmir embodies enduring hostilities between Pakistan and India. Pakistan supports separatist insurgents in Indian-held Kashmir, while Indian repression demonstrates their intention never to allow self-determination in the territory. This paper explores influential historical factors, the nature of the guerilla groups, and the problem's impact on global politics. The sources of value and environmental change demonstrate historical influences which molded the modern attitudes of the Pakistanis, Indians, and Kashmiris. Guerilla strategy, tactics, support, organization, cohesion, environment, and the Indian government response reveal the nature of the insurgent groups. The potential for escalation to nuclear war is also examined.

A deadlock over Kashmir exists on the subcontinent. After independence in 1947, threats from Islamic Pakistan convinced the Hindu maharajah of Kashmir to seek protection from India. India never honored the agreements for self-determination of the Muslim majority in Kashmir, and three Indo-Pakistani wars resolved nothing. In the late 1980s, insurgent infiltration of Kashmir reemerged. A brutal Indian Army response on the population alienated the Kashmiris. Harsh repression and continued guerilla activity lead to the assumption that resolution is unforeseeable. The great powers abandoned bipolar positions and adopted positions of neutrality on Kashmir.

Pakistan and India's positions are opposites. Pakistan favors multilateral talks which include Russia, China, and the US because they hold confidence in the original requisite for self-determination for a Muslim majority in Kashmir. India prefers bilateral talks, and some progress has been made. However, India is likely to continue imposing its will in Kashmir through physical control and military superiority.

Russian Arms Sales to India

The implosion of the Soviet Union created problems in the supply and demand aspects of Russian arms sales to India. Slowed defense conversion yields poor quality weapon systems which only sell below cost abroad. Indian demand waned because of the poor product and indigenous manufacturing efforts.

Past trade and diplomatic efforts illuminate the intertwined relationship of these two countries. This paper discusses the breakup of the Soviet Union, recent trends in Russian defense conversion, the declined demand for Russian arms in India, and reasons for India to continue Russian arms purchases.

The Russian trend toward slower defense conversion means prolonged inefficiency, poor customer support for spare parts and maintenance, and a suffered reputation. The poor reputation of cheap Russian arms tightens prospects for hard currency customers. Russia has demonstrated a willingness to return to a modified barter system with India. Due to the high prices of Western weaponry and the slow progress of indigenous efforts, India is likely to take advantage of Russia's temporarily low prices.

Even with the prospect of little hard currency earnings from near term arms sales to India, Russia still has many interests. The poor quality of Russian weapons forces sales to countries which lack hard currency; however, halting production raises unemployment and promotes civil unrest. Barter arrangements with India provide the Russian market with cheap consumer goods during these difficult times. Their historical trade relationship made them interdependent in many industrial relationships which included arms production under license. Finally, flooding the Indian military with Russian arms now preserves an arms market for the future. As the defense industry becomes competitive, future sales of upgrades for existing weapon systems, spare parts, and other support activities will provide substantial hard currency revenues.

Army Intelligence Collection and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917

Observers of the Mexican Revolutionary period have stated that prior to World War I, the US Army had no functioning intelligence organization. At the outset of war, just two officers and a few civilian clerks performed the central intelligence function at the War Department level. Some observers report that the renaissance of Army intelligence was due to the efforts of one man, Major Ralph H. Ven Deman, who returned from the field to Washington in 1915 stating that no central function was being carried out. This is partially correct, since what minimal central intelligence coordination, analysis, indications and warnings, and dissemination did exist then were in the State Department.

Some imply that the Army had no effective current or basic intelligence collection program or organization. That implication is not true, because the US Army created a comprehensive, efficient collection organization in response to the Mexican Revolution. This was in place at the outbreak of war and the consequent disturbances in the Border Region. When the US entered the war, the collection organization was fully functioning.

Collection activities developed in response to the problems in the Mexican border region bear more than a passing resemblance to today's. Many doctrines and procedures used then are similar, with most differences in terminology. The period of the Mexican Revolution gave rise to procedures now taken for granted: 1) distributed production by subject matter in offices best suited to the tasks so that all matters of interest are covered and none left uncovered; 2) proactive collection responsive to specified requirements for information lacking in the data base; 3) a regular production cycle responsive to the needs of the users; and 4) regularly assigned and accountable officers engaged in intelligence gathering and production. Memos, letters, and published doctrinal materials all show an understanding of the need for trained and dedicated intelligence personnel, using both overt and covert methods.

The Political Impact of the Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Roman Catholic Churches in the Wake of Yugoslavia's Dissolution

The Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Roman Catholic Churches have evolved in opposite directions during the past millennium to arrive at different places in their current societies. The Croatian Catholic Church historically had little influence in Croatian politics and was, in fact, often repressed for its nationalist tendencies. Today, however, it holds the preeminent place in Croatian society and is a major political force. Conversely, the Serbian Church has lost influence over the years until today, when it is virtually powerless.

The Croatian Church was repressed three times in its history for its political activities. When Croatia's Bishop Gregory tried in 1100 to institute the Slavonic Liturgy into the Latin Croatian Mass in order to give Croats a separate identity within the Roman Church, he was repressed by the Pope and his bishopric abolished. Croatia's Bishop Strossmayer tried to unite Croats and Serbs into a Yugoslav state through a religious union of the churches, but he also failed. Tito repressed the Croatian Church for fomenting Croatian nationalism after World War II, during which time the Croatian Church collaborated with the Croatian fascist government. Eventually, the Croatian Church became the center of the Croatian nationalist movement. In 1990, the Croatian Church was instrumental in electing a party which brought independence to Croatia. Today, that church is a powerful political force.

The Serbian Church established the Serbian kingdom and influenced its early political development. After Serbia's loss to the Turks in 1389, the Serbian Church ruled through the Turkish millet system, ensuring the Serbian national consciousness would survive. At the establishment of a Yugoslav state after World War I, Serbian Orthodoxy was the dominant religion. That changed after World War II, when Tito devitalized the Serbian Church to prevent it from ever leading an overthrow of the communist regime. Today, after 45 years of repression, the Serbian Orthodox Church is powerless to affect change in Serbia, even though the church has called for the resignation of the government and an end to the war in Croatia and Bosnia.

Eastern Germany's Treuhand: Its Evolving Privatization Role

Bonn's use of the Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency or Treuhand for short) as the vehicle for privatizing former East German state enterprises provides an opportunity to understand the difficulties in transforming a command economy into market capitalism. No other former communist country has the advantages of the German experience: vast financial resources; hard currency system; stable government with a generous social safety net; highly developed regulatory system; access to modern technology, equipment, and expert managerial advice; highly skilled and educated work force; population with a single language and common historic culture; and full access to both Eastern and Western markets.

Even with Germany's numerous advantages, the sheer scale and complexity of the Treuhand's undertaking can only be described as daunting. This reality was largely overlooked or dismissed during Germany's euphoric drive for rapid reunification in 1990. Chancellor Kohl changed his initial view that rapid privatization would quickly make eastern Germany prosperous. Rapid restructuring and liquidation of formerly communist owned and operated property created mass unemployment and worker disaffection in the new *Länder* (eastern Germany), inspiring complaints in the old *Länder* (western Germany) for the increased taxes Bonn levied to pay for the increased costs of privatization.

Having no model, Bonn learned rapid privatization had to be tempered with a comprehensive social welfare net to assist, retrain, and reeducate the large numbers of unemployed. The government had to rebuild the infrastructure: roads, bridges, rails, communication, and electricity networks. These actions were beyond the scope of responsibilities and capabilities of the Treuhand alone. Therefore, the Trust's privatization efforts required the support and leadership of the entire German government. The ambitious and optimistic privatization program caused worker disaffection and widespread protest, both counterproductive to long term prosperity.

While the Treuhand has sold off most of its assets, attracted billions in investment, and saved thousands of jobs, eastern German unemployment and the Trust's privatization debt continue to grow. Privatization efforts show that countries making the transition to capitalism will have to lower expectations for quick economic recovery and prosperity. Since Germany is unique, possessing the greatest financial and structural advantages possible to make the transition to a market economy, any massive transition of the scale needed in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States will be even more painful and prolonged than the one Germany has been experiencing.

Germany's Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia: The Geopolitical Implications

Many observers of Germany's "precipitous" recognition of Croatia and Slovenia have interpreted that action as a demonstration of unbridled unilateralism. Analysis of the factors affecting the decision, however, strongly suggests the contrary. Bonn largely acted in response to its perceived national interests and only after months of continued domestic political pressure, even then settling for less than it wanted to maintain European unity.

Germany has had strong historic, economic, and political ties to Croatia and Slovenia since the time of the Holy Roman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Ties continued into modern times with alliances during World Wars I and II. The strong emotional bond from this ancient relationship resulted in German moral outrage by what they viewed as the European Community's inability to stop Serbian aggression against their Croat friends.

Two additional factors influenced the German drive for recognition. As fighting between Serbs and Croats escalated, growing numbers of Yugoslav refugees (over 70,000 by the end of 1991) imposed a financial drain on Germany's already burdened economy. This influenced 70 percent of western Germans to rate refugee and foreigner problems their greatest concern. Germans also felt strongly that their Balkan brothers had the same moral right of self-determination they had exercised in their 1990 reunification. Ultimately, international recognition resulting from German leadership would help stabilize the conflict by internationalizing it. Bonn believed the Serbian aggressors could be forced to stop their destabilizing land-grab by isolating them politically and economically.

Because Germany's number one priority for the rest of the millennium is completing and consolidating the new Germany, the US and Europe must recognize Germany's preeminent concern for maintaining regional stability. Continued European unity is also a prerequisite for the German unification effort; therefore, Germany is determined to maintain leadership in the EC. As demonstrated in its drive to attain recognition for Slovenia and Croatia, Germany will

negotiate with its EC partners to develop a consensus. If this fails, Germany will pull mightily on its EC allies to drag them toward adopting the policies it sees as correct. Unless Germany perceived a threat to its national survival, however, Bonn will not pull so hard that they or other members will withdraw from the EC. European unity is just as important as regional stability in Germany's quest for reunification.

Scott, George B. (Gross)

SEP 1992

Middle Eastern Insurgent Strategies: A Comparative Analysis of the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) and the War in Afghanistan (1979-1988)

The Middle East has experienced a significant number of insurgencies in the post-World War II period. Two of the most important occurred in Algeria and Afghanistan. On the surface, the parallel between the two cases is obvious: Middle Eastern insurgents defeated some of the best-trained and equipped armies of their time. The National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria triumphed over the French government and its colonial administration, while the Mujahideen of the Afghan Resistance achieved victory over the Soviet Union's Red Army. However, a deeper examination of each case reveals that success was not so clear cut, and that significant and important differences exist between the two insurgent groups and the strategies employed.

This study examines and compares the two cases to identify common factors of success and to draw insights useful to analysts and policymakers dealing with the Middle East today. The central thesis examines how the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Algeria both succeeded because their overall strategy focused on sustaining military operations while allowing sufficient political pressures to mount on their respective opponents. In each case, the organizational approach, political efforts, and military activities of the insurgents are examined in order to assess how and why the overall strategy achieved its ultimately successful end, and whether that strategy was developed deliberately or by accident.

Shade, David M. (Hunter)

SEP 1992

An Application and Comparison of Bayesian Analysis Techniques

Bayesian analysis uses events (data) to revise initial probabilities of hypothesis. Probabilities of events are assessed in light of the hypothesis, and Bayes' formula is used to produce revised probabilities of the hypothesis. Several different forms of Bayesian analysis have been developed and used within the Intelligence Community. Conditionally independent analysis analyzes each datum in isolation from the rest. Conditionally dependent analysis analyzes each datum in light of all the other data. Hierarchical Bayes analyzes the relationships between the data to produce a hierarchical structure depicting the data.

A hypothetical embassy security scenario was analyzed using conditionally independent, conditionally dependent, and hierarchical Bayesian techniques. The same hypothesis set and initial probabilities were used for each analytical method. Conditionally independent and dependent analysis were completed first, since conditionally independent analysis is the first step of conditionally dependent analysis. Hierarchical analysis was completed last.

Revised probabilities for each method were different. Conditional independence was relatively simple and showed moderate probability change in response to data. Conditional dependence took a great amount of time but showed the greatest change in probabilities. Hierarchical Bayes, which was moderately complex, showed little or no change after analyzing the data.

Conditionally independent analysis is overly simplistic but provides a quick estimate of probabilities. While not extremely accurate, it would be effective given short time limits or limited analytical assets. Conditionally independent analysis is the most accurate and thorough but requires an inordinate amount of time if more than four data are included. This would be most effective in a situation without a time limit and with a minimum of data. Hierarchical inference is the least useful. As applied to the scenario, it results in little change in initial probabilities. Hierarchical has a number of faults which could be responsible for the poor performance; however, its advantages do merit further investigation.

The Effects of Psychological Operations on Narcoterrorism: A Case Study of the Extraditables' Victory Over Colombia

The Extraditables, a group of violent Colombian narcotraffickers, recently won what should be considered a decisive victory over the government of Colombia. They successfully employed terrorist acts which forced Colombia to abandon its hard-line commitment to extraditing drug traffickers to the US for meaningful prosecution. The Extraditables attained their principal objective, the termination of the extradition policy, largely because they masterfully exploited psychological operations (PSYOPS) while the US repeatedly missed such opportunities. The lack of an effective combined US-Colombian PSYOPS program to counter the Extraditables' activities contributed to the coerced surrender of the Colombian government position. A defensive and offensive government PSYOPS campaign might have significantly altered the course of events in Colombia in a manner more favorable to US objectives.

Although the Extraditables were extremely effective in employing PSYOPS to attack the Colombian national will, they were also vulnerable to PSYOPS conducted by the US and Colombian governments. These actions could have both blocked narcoterrorist moves with defensive measures and aggressively seized the offensive with their own initiatives, designed to both counter the effects of narcoterrorist activities and to actively target the group itself. Although combined American and Colombian counter-narcoterrorist policy to date has failed to exploit PSYOPS successfully, a well-designed program could still prove quite effective in countering a renewed narcoterrorist threat in Colombia or a similar campaign in other countries if properly tailored to specific regional circumstances.

Sirois, Brian J. Parchomenko)

JUN 1992

The Soviet Presidency: The Gorbachev Years and Beyond

Events in the Soviet Union since Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 have culminated in the political, economic, and military disintegration of the old Union. Gorbachev's initial attempts to reform Soviet society produced a stalemate by late 1989, with bureaucratic resistance apparent in various echelons of the government. Gorbachev's early reforms concentrated on improving the economic sector but produced no results because of political opposition and bureaucratic inertia. Consequently, by 1989, Gorbachev necessarily turned his reform efforts to the political system.

The establishment of a rule of law state slowly evolved as Gorbachev's chief goal for the political system. Prior to Gorbachev, the power and authority of the office of president had been virtually nonexistent and was mostly ceremonial in nature. From 1985-1991, Gorbachev attempted to establish the Soviet presidency as a viable power in the Soviet government. This paper examines how a strong, executive presidency evolved under the guidance of Mikhail Gorbachev. It concludes that the demise of the Soviet Union and its organs of government did not signal the end of the governmental reform movement. Rather, the executive branch reforms initiated by Gorbachev have taken root firmly in most of the former republics of the Soviet Union.

Each of these new states has adopted the concept of a strong, executive president as a key institution for their developing democracies. Significantly, however, acceptance of the rule of law and a strong presidency has not been uniform in all states. The forced removal of Gamsakhurdia as president of Georgia is an example of how weak democracy can be. In most of the states, however, the transfer has been extremely smooth with only minor disagreements between the legislative and executive branches of the respective states' individual republics.

Smith, Craig A. (Ingersoll)

JUL 1992

Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path to Revolution?

In 1980, the country of Peru returned to civilian leadership. That same year, however, a violent, pro-Maoist group known as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) began its reign of terror, a reign which has cost over 23,000 lives during the past 12 years. At first, the Peruvian government chose to ignore the threat. This proved to be a costly mistake.

This thesis examines the background of Sendero Luminoso during 12 years of violence and three administrations. The cultural and ethnic differences between people of Indian and Spanish descent in Peru is discussed. Sendero Luminoso's history, ideology, and organization are examined as well as the 1980-1985 guerilla war during the Belaunde administration. Finally, Sendero Luminoso's actions during the Garcia and Fujimori administrations and the possibility for revolution in Peru by Sendero Luminoso is explored.

Sternberg, Stephen M. (Parchomenko)

DEC 1991

SOYUZ and the Black Colonels: The Darker Side of Soviet Military Reform

The military has long enjoyed a privileged status within Soviet society. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, however, that privileged status has come under fire. As a microcosm of the Soviet Union, the Soviet military represents many of the ills that have characterized Soviet society. A rigid hierarchy of command, privileged comfort for the politically powerful, technological backwardness, and rampant waste and corruption have contributed to the failure of the Soviet government to meet the needs of its people.

Gorbachev's attempts at reform, however, have solved few of the problems they were addressing and instead have created acrimonious debate on where the future of the Soviet Union lies. One group with strong opinions for the future success of the Soviet empire has been the SOYUZ group of deputies in the Congress of People's Deputies. Led by their charismatic spokesman, Colonel Viktor Alksnis, the "Black Colonel," they have lobbied and pressured the Soviet leadership to preserve the union of the Soviet states and return the military to its former greatness.

Toole, Stephen F. (Gross)

NOV 1991

Azerbaijan and Iran: The Bear or the Lion? Prospects for Azerbaijan-Iran Relations in the Nineties

A sustained improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations has facilitated an unprecedented breakthrough in Iran's relationship with its northern neighbor, Azerbaijan SSR. The question of Iran's future relationship with nominally independent Azerbaijan provides the central focus of this work.

The bond between Iranian Azeris and Soviet Azeris is explored in detail, including past cross-border revolutionary threats to Iranian rulers. Azerbaijan is seen as a significant test bed for the viability of Iranian fundamentalism or foreign policy in the Caucasus and Central Asian Republics. As such, Azerbaijan is found to be a likely role model for other, recently independent Central Asian republics.

The Arak River border incident of New Year's Day 1990 and the Soviet Army's Baku intervention of 23 January 1990 provide a focal point for the analysis of Iranian, Soviet, Azeri, and Armenian interests involved. Media claims that these incidents represent a Fundamentalist Islamic revolt are contrasted with the true catalysts of the 1989-1990 crisis, ancient and unresolved ethnic hatred. Moscow's successful restoration of the Party in Baku is seen to be only a temporary postponement of a nationalist transformation of the local Azeri Communist Party determined to regain popular support.

Recent declarations of independence by Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh highlight the continuing need for greater contextual understanding of distinct and common Iran-Azerbaijan interests. The near-term regional potential for economic distress, new alignments, changing borders, expanded ethnic warfare, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and civil war drive home the need to appreciate the direction of Azeri independence. The chronic struggle of Azerbaijan with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh offers one model of explosive inter-Soviet ethnic feuds that may yet ripple across the border of the former USSR.

Historical analysis of Iran-Azerbaijan-Soviet diplomacy and Azerbaijan's ethnic discord can reduce ambiguities in our understanding of this region and aid us in the most difficult of intelligence problems, the gauging of probable future trends.

Intelligence Support to Business: What is the Role of the Intelligence Community?

With the danger of nuclear aggression against the United States all but gone, the threat to the economic well-being of the country is increasingly being identified as the primary national security concern of the 1990s. The strength of a country is no longer measured solely by its military power but also by its economy and industry. Today, the United States faces fierce competition from both Europe and Asia.

Many countries provide substantial support to industries they feel will best compete in the international environment. Support ranges from cooperation in research and development to providing proprietary information on foreign competitors. Some may not live up to treaties concerning trade. In light of the evolving economic threat and current economic downturn, politicians and policy makers alike are scrambling to find solutions to the economic problems facing the country.

The linkage of economic well-being with national security has put pressure on the Intelligence Community to contribute in new ways to the competitiveness of the American economy. This new initiative is raising many questions, but as of yet, little consensus or solution. Obstacles to a practical solution are many, including ethical objections and a desire not to offend allies, who are often our fiercest competitors. Any solution will certainly influence relations with allied intelligence services.

In the past, economic intelligence concerns were primarily centered around studying grain harvests in the Soviet Union and gross national products of other countries. Today, economic intelligence is evolving into the study of emerging technologies and support to trade agreement negotiations and treaty implementation. Some suggest further evolution into areas such as targeting actions of foreign companies. This paper discusses issues surrounding an expanded role of the Intelligence Community, including potential problems such as the protection of sources and methods and fairness to American companies, and the appropriate roles the Community in enhancing US economic competitiveness.

The Probable Course of Defense Conversion in Russia: An Estimate

The Russian defense industry is facing an enormous challenge. Once the sacred cow of the Soviet empire, the military industrial complex must now begin to compete in a changing economic environment based on free market principles and a dwindling defense budget. The answer is said to be "defense conversion;" however, the definition of this term is often manipulated. According to the Russian magazine *New Times*, scrapping rusty warships as well as delivering oranges to Chukotka reindeer-breeders by military transport planes is labeled conversion.

True conversion manifests itself in only two forms: employing existing military equipment for civilian needs, such as using tracked vehicles for earth moving equipment; and switching production lines and entire factories from producing military equipment to civilian goods. A substantial segment of the Russian defense industry has chosen yet a third path and is carrying on business as usual.

The success or failure of the conversion process will foretell the future of Russia's economy as a whole. This paper examines factors such as defense industry employment levels, industrial output, defense budgets, and natural resources. Obstacles preventing a smooth transition to a demilitarized market based economy include shortage of investment capital, unstable investment environment, production inefficiencies, and lack of a national security policy. Many defense enterprises responded to the challenge not by energetically entering the civilian marketplace but by aggressively seeking other arms markets. Termed "economic conversion," the rationalization for this decision will be examined in detail as well. A prediction of the future course for the Russian defense industry is also included.

Intelligence and Decisionmaking in the Carter Administration: The Iran Crisis

The 1978 crisis in Iran revealed failures on the part of US intelligence and decisionmaking processes which affected the ability of the foreign policy process to manage the situation and protect US interests. More importantly, this revealed how fragile the relationship between intelligence and decisionmaking can be. The Carter Administration's handling of the crisis is used as a case study in the breakdown of the intelligence-decisionmaking relationship.

The problem is viewed from three perspectives: the organization of the administration and the decisionmakers; the developing crisis in Iran and intelligence reporting; and the relationship between the two, or more specifically, the breakdown of that relationship. Memoirs of administration members and archival material were used.

The administration's handling of the crisis reveals a number of weaknesses which contributed to its failure to manage the Iran crisis and served to erode the relationship between intelligence and decisionmaking. These problems include the National Security Advisor acting as gatekeeper to the President, an arms-length relationship between the President and the Director of Central Intelligence, a National Intelligence Estimate process not suited for fast-paced crises, and warnings affected by preconceptions among analysts and members of the administration.

Quiet Victory: Intelligence and Operations in the Battle of the Atlantic

The German U-boat offensive during World War II was the longest campaign of the war, lasting from 3 September 1939 until Germany's surrender on 8 May 1945. The Battle of the Atlantic was the costliest phase of this campaign for both sides. ADM Karl Doenitz sent his U-boats into the Atlantic to sink Allied merchant ships (preferably more than the Allies were capable of producing), disrupt the Allied sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and prevent US aid from reaching the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

Allied strategy was to open a second front in Europe to relieve pressure in Russia; this required shipping huge numbers of men and materiel. On an operational level, the goals were to ship the necessary men and materiel to forward staging areas in England in preparation for an Allied offensive and to ship equipment to Russia to ensure their continued defense.

The Germans almost won the Battle of the Atlantic in the winter of 1942-1943. However, on 24 May 1943, ADM Doenitz withdrew his U-boats from the North Atlantic convoy routes after failing to achieve the objectives. He quietly admitted defeat. The Allied victory was the result of an efficient and effective intelligence and operations interface: efficient in its use of all-source intelligence, and effective in its tactical application.

The US Navy developed this interface in order to meet the U-boat challenge and demonstrate the value and role of intelligence as a tool in the development of the operational art. This paper focuses on the development and application of the US Navy's intelligence and operations system developed to combat the German U-boat and will explore two points: how intelligence and operations interface evolved within the Navy, and how this interface turned the Battle of the Atlantic.

Gorbachev's New Thinking and Soviet-Cuban Relations During the Gorbachev Years, 1985-1991

Former General Secretary and President Mikhail Gorbachev made economic reform his first priority. To that end, he hoped to bolster his crumbling Union. Gorbachev put forth the principles of reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense largely to lower tensions between East and West, decrease Soviet military expenditures, and dedicate resources to reassembling his moribund economy. As part of the new political thinking introduced by Gorbachev, Moscow's traditionally hostile and aggressive Communist ideology in the international arena was initially subordinated to political

and economic pragmatism. More recently, its basic tenets were either grudgingly or willingly repudiated by Gorbachev and his reform-minded colleagues in the leadership.

This case study of Cuba is intended to provide an overview of the dramatic shift in Soviet foreign policy objectives during the Gorbachev years and how they were influenced by domestic necessity and political pressures. With the Soviet repudiation of its former policy of supporting revolution abroad, there was no longer any rationale for bolstering the economies of former allies for little or no return, especially at a time when the Soviet Union was in desperate need of assistance to prevent its own economic collapse.

In this new environment, Cuba diminished in value to the Soviet Union. Moscow, faced with its own economic crisis, began cutting economic assistance and distancing itself politically from Castro's hard-line Stalinist policies while trying to foster closer ties to the West and the US in particular. In fact, Castro's outspoken disavowal of Gorbachev's democratic reforms made him a political liability to the Soviet leader. In that environment, Gorbachev faced even more significant policy options regarding Cuba. The impact of the failed coup and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union on relations with Cuba in 1992 and beyond will be discussed.

Weis, Keith M. (Gordon)

SEP 1992

Origins, Development, and Future of Finnish Neutrality

Active neutrality, the current foreign policy of Finland, has been pragmatic and successful. Initially espoused following the country's independence in 1917 and modified in the post-World War II era, this foreign policy is slowly being altered. It has served the people of Finland well and has seen the country through several international crises. The crumbling of the Soviet Empire and the formation of the European Community into a powerful economic and political organization poised to fill the void created by the end of the Cold War are the two events that caused Finland to turn away from its traditional policy of neutrality.

This paper examines the evolution of Finland's foreign policy, from its time as a dominion of the Swedish and later the Tsarist Empires, through World Wars I and II, to the current day. Finland developed a unique brand of peacetime neutrality after World War II reflecting its location next to a strong Eastern Empire, desire to remain outside Great Power conflicts, and ability of successive Finnish presidents to successfully avoid military confrontations with the Soviet Union. The Finns object to the term "Finlandization," as they feel that it is improperly applied their conduct of foreign affairs.

Finland's policy of neutrality may have become obsolete. Since 1989, the diplomatic landscape of Europe has been dramatically altered, and Finnish diplomats are responding the new situation. The collapse of the USSR and the demise of the Warsaw Pact has offered Finland new options in its foreign policy. The Finns no longer have to worry about balancing between East and West. They are free to improve their relations with the West. Finland's request to join the European Community is the clearest signal that Finland will be significantly altering its policy of neutrality.

Weis, Keith M. (Stevens)

JUN 1992

Quebec: Nation Within a Nation

The government of Canada is currently embroiled in a crisis which threatens to result in the secession of the province of Quebec. In the fall of 1992, the people of that province may vote on the formation of an independent country. This crisis is not the first time the province has threatened to shatter the dominion. In 1980, the same question was put before voters but was defeated. This separatist movement is not new to Quebec but is the outgrowth of what is viewed by most Francophones as 200 years of domination by Anglophones.

Canadian history can best be described as a continual struggle between the Anglophones (English-speaking Canadians) and Francophones (French-speaking Canadians, mainly centered in Quebec). Linguistic differences are the most obvious point of contention, however numerous other issues divide the people. An examination of the history of the country with a discussion of its political make-up is necessary to discover the causes of the current crisis. The economies of separation will be included as well as an outlook on the potential outcome of the vote.

Revolution Averted: A Strategic Appraisal of the El Salvadoran Civil War

El Salvador offers fertile ground for social revolution, yet the ten year civil war has brought only minor political change. The complex interaction of internal and external factors and the influence of historical events have enabled the Salvadoran government to avert a revolution. Strategic analysis provides a balanced examination of the key factors that prevented a revolution, including the Salvadoran government's historical and cyclical use of accommodation and repression, US involvement, political and military shortfalls of the guerilla insurgency, and the historical timing of internal and external events.

US support for the Salvadoran government has been the most important external factor ensuring its survival. US aid not only prevented the military defeat of the Salvadoran Army but directed the political development of the government. Internal divisions, strategic shortfalls, and a shrinking support base have undermined the insurgency effort to topple the Salvadoran government. Victimized by historical events such as the rapid political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Marxist rebels missed an opportunity to seize an anarchic government in 1980 and found themselves discredited and even ignored by 1990.

A cease-fire agreement ending the civil war in El Salvador is likely in the near future. With the Salvadoran government bending to international and domestic pressure and guerilla leaders left with few political or military options, significant progress toward a cease-fire agreement was made in 1991. A cease-fire will only partially resolve domestic grievances in El Salvador, and the insurgents will maintain the ability and desire to continue armed struggle. Until the formidable task of neutralizing social discontent can be achieved, the Salvadoran government will be faced with a viable and persistent revolutionary challenge.

Wilde, Scott W. (Parchomenko)

FEB 1992

Sino-Soviet Military Relations: Will the "Hundred Flowers" Keep Blooming?

A thorough understanding of the past is required for a thorough understanding of the present state of Sino-Soviet relations. This study examines the development of the Sino-Soviet military relationship from its beginnings in 1950 to the 1991 Soviet coup attempt. A detailed history of this often unstable relationship is presented as background, followed by the strategic and economic rationale that drove both countries to improve relations.

Technology transfer, arms sales, troop reductions, and cooperative efforts by both countries to improve their economic access to the Asia-Pacific region are presented as evidence of this evolving climate of mutual cooperation. The impact of the failed coup in the Soviet Union on the relationship between the former adversaries is also analyzed. An overall evaluation of the rapprochement is presented in light of its impact on China, the former Soviet Union, and the United States, as well as other countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

Williams, Brian E. (Harris)

OCT 1991

The Future European Security Landscape: A Look at the Options

The collapse of the Berlin Wall and apparent demise of communism have ushered in a new era. As Europe seeks its place in the multi-polar world, it must have security mechanisms capable of meeting new threats which are vastly different from those of the Cold War era. Current security mechanisms, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Western European Union (WEU), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), United Nations (UN), and eventually the European Community (EC), will contribute to European security in the near term. However, as Europe moves into the twenty-first century, a solely European defense community will emerge to provide for European security needs. It will be complemented by the CSCE, which ensures a continued US presence in Europe.

Armenians: Surviving on the Edge of Empire

Throughout much of its history, Armenia has constituted a border area between competing empires and has often served as a battlefield or route of conquest. Nevertheless, Armenians have endured as a distinct ethnic group, having survived life on the edge of empires for over 2,500 years. This paper explores Armenianism, concentrating on what it means to be Armenian and how Armenians have survived as a distinct ethnic group. It also looks at the role of ethnicity in determining US interests in Armenia and explores the current goals of Armenian political activists.

Armenian ethnic identity remains strong and is probably increasing. Although a relatively minor ethnic group by world standards, Armenians do have an impressive amount of influence worldwide and now even have an independent homeland on which to focus their identity. Two of the main reasons for the success of the Armenians in retaining cohesion and identity have been the unifying and strengthening influences of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Armenian language. These two factors more than any others sustained the Armenians as a people after their political identity was lost in the Middle Ages. In this century, Turkish genocide has also helped to focus and strengthen Armenianism. Armenian political activism, which had been directed mainly against Turkey, is now focused on solving the Karabakh dispute and building a viable Armenian nation. The key to the latter is probably a solution to the former.

At this time, the US stake in Armenia is limited. Regionally, a continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute could harm US-Turkish relations (due to differing sympathies) or contribute to internal unrest with Iran's large Azeri minority. If the Armenian Republic can at least reach a *modus vivendi* with Azerbaijan and begin rebuilding its economy, the ethnic ties between the US and Armenia could lead to a strong relationship with growing US interests.

Water in the Fertile Crescent: Enough to Share?

Water scarcity and water sharing problems are increasing in the Fertile Crescent region of the Middle East. Conditions in Jordan and Israel are the worst; however, Syria is not much better, with large deficits forecast for the end of the century. Egypt will likely be unable to meet its water needs by the year 2000. Iraq is currently facing water quality difficulties, but it is unclear when, or if, it will have water quantity problems.

No single solution to Fertile Crescent water scarcity problems exists, but a combination of remedies may be successful. Population growth will be a factor to control to avoid water shortages. A reduction or slower increase in the amount of water devoted to agriculture may be necessary in water scarce countries. Another partial solution would be to develop alternate sources of water, particularly in Israel and Jordan and probably Syria as well.

The water sharing problems of the Fertile Crescent are not as much a result of a lack of water as a lack of trust and cooperation. Increased cooperation, therefore, will be the most important ingredient in any future solutions. Fertile Crescent countries simply do not have sufficient internal water resources to meet their growing needs, nor do they have the money to solve their water difficulties on their own. Unfortunately, the outlook for cooperation is not good. The Middle East is the world's most heavily armed region and the scene for most of the conventional wars fought during the last 40 years. The continuing and possibly growing influence of militant Islamic fundamentalism, and the worldwide trend toward ethnic strife both promise to make Middle East peace and cooperation harder to attain in the future.

The one positive trend in regional relations is the ongoing Middle East peace talks. If the peace talks end in failure or stalemate, however, the outlook for solutions to water problems in the Fertile Crescent will be poor. Future Middle Eastern wars are almost a certainty, but water will probably not be their primary cause. Water has a long way to go before it can replace traditional conflict-generating factors. Nevertheless, quarrels over the basic availability of water may contribute to future conflicts by exacerbating existing tensions.

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